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ABSTRACT 
            This thesis examines the law of insider trading in both the American 
and Egyptian legal systems. It seeks to pinpoint the policy rationale behind 
prohibiting insider trading, the theories of civil enforcement and 
criminalization, and the concept of tipping in the United States. It also analyzes 
the express statutory prohibition under Egyptian law. Furthermore, it explains 
the doctrinal link between securities fraud and insider trading in the U.S. as 
well as the enforcement mechanisms in place at the SEC, the NYSE, and the 
NASDAQ. It also surveys the surveillance authority of the Egyptian Financial 
Regularity Authority and of the Egyptian Stock Exchange. It concludes to that 
both the American and Egyptian law prohibit the offense of insider trading and 
that there is an effective enforcement mechanism in the United States. Yet, the 
Egyptian enforcement authorities still need to adopt a clear and more efficient 
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procedure for enforcing the offense of insider trading. The Egyptian Financial 
Regularity Authority resources should be bolstered to recruit skilled personnel 
and equip them with artificial intelligence technology. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Egyptian Stock Market is one of the earliest stock markets in 
history. The first stock exchange established in Egypt was the Alexandria 
Stock Exchange in 1888. It was one of the five most active stock markets in 
the world. Unfortunately, due to the adoption of communist ideas after the 
1953 revolution, market activities in Egypt radically diminished until 1992, 
when the Egyptian Government switched and started applying pure capitalist 
principles.1 Since then, the Egyptian Stock Market began to grow. Egyptian 
Business Law Regulations adopted open market principles and strove to attract 
foreign investment. They incorporated global trade customs and gave as many 
incentives as they could, such as tax exemptions, simplifying foreign 
corporations’ registration, and free capital rehabilitation.  
However, the Egyptian Stock Market has not completely recovered 
from Egypt’s communistic rule. The practices of investment in corporate stock 
have never been as strong as they are in the United States. Americans tend to 
invest heavily in the stock market, making it the backbone of the American 
commercial system.2 More than half of the American population owns stocks 
and actively trades in the stock market.3 On the other hand, a middle-class 
Egyptian citizen rarely invests in the stock market on publicly held 
corporations.4 It seems this is mainly because of the limited number of listed 
companies in the Egyptian Stock Exchange, and not because of the lack of 
profitability of the investment.5  
                                                 
* Masters of Law Thesis, 2018 at Maurer Law School, University of 
Indiana 
1 Shahira F. Abdel Shahid, Does Ownership Structure Affect Firm Value? 
Evidence from the Egyptian Stock Market, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK (Jan. 2003), 
(unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=378580.  
2 See Illegal insider trading: how widespread is the problem and is there 
adequate criminal enforcement?, Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong., 31-445 (2006).  
3 Justin McCarthy, Just Over Half of Americans Own Stocks, Matching 
Record Low, GALLUP (Apr. 20, 2016), https://news.gallup.com/poll/190883/half-
americans-own-stocks-matching-record-low.aspx.  
4 Cf. Brooke Cobb, Investment Options In Egypt, INT’L STRATEGIES, 
https://www.escapeartist.com/egypt/invest/investment-options-egypt/ (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2020). Egyptians usually invest in unreal economies, like the real estate 
market, and the resulting lack of stock investment practices between Egyptians have 
had a tremendous drawback not just economically but also environmentally because 
people usually direct their investment to real estate market and buy fertilized land 
and engage in soil dredging to construct houses and sell the units for profit or just 
keep it and gamble for expected future high prices. Id. 
5 Justin Kuepper, A Guide to Investing in Egypt, BALANCE, 
https://www.thebalance.com/a-guide-to-investing-in-egypt-1979021 (last updated 
Jan. 26, 2020). 
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The price–earnings ratio in the Egyptian stock market is higher than 
the American ratio.6 Partnership corporations and family-owned businesses 
are the most dominant forms of investment in the Egyptian commercial 
system. A culture of investing in the stock market is crucial for a healthy 
financial system. In order to recover the Egyptian financial system, the capital 
market regulatory authority must seek means to increase the number of 
companies listed in stock exchanges and develop a mechanism to raise public 
interest in investing in publicly traded companies.  
In addition, market integrity is crucial for the robustness of active 
stock markets in any given country. The investor needs a fair market and 
trustworthy insiders. Market integrity is built on two main components: 
adequate disclosure and a fraud-free market. Stock market actors, such as 
directors, officers, key employees (insiders), broker-dealers, investment 
banks, and outside counsel (temporary insiders), play a crucial role in building 
market integrity. They have access to material, nonpublic information about 
the company. If these actors trade or tip someone else to trade based on this 
information, they can gain profits or avoid losses in a way that is not available 
to ordinary shareholders. Misusing this nonpublic information negates market 
integrity, and, for that reason, countries prohibit the offense of insider trading.   
As in American securities regulations, Egyptian securities regulations 
that prohibit securities fraud are very broad. Egyptian law directly prohibits 
insider trading, but not on the basis of common law fraud as in American law. 
Egyptian securities regulations adopted different tools to curtail insider 
trading. Some of these rules expressly prohibit trading on the basis of material, 
nonpublic information, and others prohibit any fraudulent or manipulative acts 
that could influence securities prices. Criminalization of insider trading under 
Egyptian law finds its basis in the Capital Market Law (CML) No. 95 of 1992, 
which stipulates the penalty of imprisonment for a term not less than two years 
and a fine of up to 20 million EGP or twice the amount of gains realized, or 
the loss avoided.7 There are also different authorities who are empowered to 
enforce securities regulations. The Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA) is 
the main surveillance authority over the stock market. The CML empowers the 
chairman of the FRA with the right to prosecute any violation of its regulations 
and the right to settle in any stage of a lawsuit. Article 21 of the CML gives 
the stock exchange chairman the power to revoke transactions that in violation 
                                                 
6 Egypt P/E Ratio, CEIC, https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/egypt/pe-
ratio (last visited Dec. 24, 2018, 11:31 AM) (listing the price/earnings ratio in 
Egypt); United States Steel PE Ratio, https://ycharts.com/companies/X/pe_ratio (last 
visited Dec. 24, 2018, 11:33 AM) (listing price/earnings ratio in the United States). 
The total number of listed companies in Egyptian Exchange including Nilex are 
around 300. Egyptian Exchange (EGX) - Listed Companies, AFR. MKTS., 
https://www.african-markets.com/en/stock-markets/egx/listed-companies (last 
visited Dec. 24, 2018, 11:29 AM).  
7 Capital Market Law No. 95 of 1992 (Mar. 14, 2018) 
https://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Egypt/Egypt_Capital_Market_Law_1992.pdf.   
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of the CML or other related securities provisions.8 The Egyptian legal system 
also allows shareholders to bring private actions through a direct complaint to 
the Attorney General’s office, which has the authority to prosecute insider 
trading after the permission of the FRA chairman.   
This research intends to examine whether the Egyptian regulations 
that prohibit insider trading are sufficient and if there is an adequate 
enforcement mechanism in place. It will address the Egyptian regulations’ 
shortcomings and steps to develop a robust framework where necessary. The 
study will compare and contrast U.S. and Egyptian securities regulations to 
examine if there are deficiencies in Egyptian securities regulations or its 
enforcement mechanism to prevent and prohibit insider trading. In the 
introduction, we define insider trading and the policy rationale behind the 
prohibition. Chapter I will be assigned to give a description of insider trading 
under American law in order to provide a reasonable background for the new 
reader. Chapter II discusses the enforcement mechanism in both the Egyptian 
and American legal systems.  
A. Definition of Insider Trading 
The term “insider trading” is a misnomer because insider trading 
applies to trade by persons who are not necessarily insiders of the corporation 
issuer. Insider trading can also be committed by “outsiders” who do not 
temporarily or permanently work or provide any services to the issuer.9 Also, 
the information that may form the basis for sale or purchase could be outside 
information, as in the case of tender offers.10 Further, insider trading may 
occur, theoretically, by canceling a contemplated trade based on inside 
information.11 However, Rule 10b–5’s “in connection with” element would 
                                                 
8 Id. The chairman of stock exchange may suspend trading offers and bids 
aiming price manipulation. He may revoke transactions which violate laws, 
provisions, regulations and decrees related to their implementation, or which have 
been carried out with manipulated prices. He may also suspend the trading of a given 
security in case its continuing transaction causes harm to the market or to 
participants in the market. The Chairman of the Authority may take any of the 
preceding actions at due time. Id. 
9 United Sates v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). Outsider trading refers to 
securities transactions based on material nonpublic information by individual who 
are not insider nor temporary insider of the issuer, the liability in these circumstances 
was not available before indorsing misappropriation theory of insider trading. Id. 
10 Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading - Part I: 
Regulation under the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
41 BUS. LAW. 223,224 (1985). 
11 Definition of Insider Trading: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of 
the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 75-705 (1987). I 
agree with Senator Armstrong when he questioned Mr. Cox saying: 
 
“Can you violate insider trading law by not 
trading? In other words, suppose you are 
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not extend to decisions to forego a planned security purchase or sale. Federal 
Securities Laws do not define insider trading, and the term “insider trading” 
does not expressly exist in any legislation.12 There was always reluctance when 
it came to codify a statutory definition for insider trading. Some scholars 
believe this reluctance was due to political reasons.13  
Arnold Jacobs testified in his statement to the U.S. House Report, 
Energy and Commerce Committee saying that, in order to enforce the broad 
anti-fraud provisions, a statutory definition was not desirable and, if we did 
create a definition, “unscrupulous traders would skirt around any definition 
constructed.”14 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defended its 
                                                 
intending to trade and then come into possession 
of such information and then don’t trade. Does 
that violate the law? He said no! But I don’t agree 
because avoiding the loss if he will buy over 
valued stocks or gain profits by maintain stocks 
he was going to sell for undervalued price that’s 
advantage not available for other shareholders 
 
Id. at 126. However, because the Rule 10b-5 stipulated that the actionable 
insider trading act need to occur “in connection with” securities transaction not just 
by canceling a contemplated transaction, as professor Manne believe “[a] failure to 
sell cannot be violated of SEC Rule 10b-5, because there has been no securities 
transaction.”). Henry C. Manne, Insider Trading and Property Rights in New 
Information, 4 CATO J. 933, 938 (1985).    
12 JAMES D. COX,ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, 
SECURITIES REGULATIONS: SELECTED STATUTES, RULES, AND FORMS 486 (2017). 
The preliminary note to §240.10b5-2 says “This section provides a non-exclusive 
definition of circumstances in which a person has a duty of trust or confidence for 
purposes of the ‘misappropriation’ theory of insider trading under Section 10(b) of 
the Act and Rule 10b-5. The law of insider trading is otherwise defined by judicial 
opinions.” Id. 
13 See Jonathan R. Macey, From Judicial Solutions to Political Solutions: 
The New, New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REV. 355 
(1988). Macey argues that there is one core side of the offense of insider trading is 
the political component, this side did not receive adequate treatment from securities 
scholars in compare with other cores like ethical and economic perspective. This lack 
of scholarly writing addressing the political perspectives of insider trading seems to 
be unbeknown in light of the current political fight among the SEC, Congress, and 
federal courts about who deserves to regulate insider trading. Each party had his own 
interests to be the regulator, and this could be clear if we reviewed their proposed 
regulations. The fact that federal courts are the least of three battled parties could be 
politically influenced make them able to articulate a reasonable treatment to insider 
trading. But this created a detest for SEC and Congress because of the original 
legislation authority they empowered in terms of securities regulations, and that 
leads to an intentional frustrate for the principle that the United States Supreme court 
had established treating insider trading over the years. Id. 
14 The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984: Hearing on H.R. 559 Before 
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 34-541 (1983).  
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“I know it when I see it, but I can’t tell you what it is”15 standard by saying, 
“the commission does not believe a statutory definition is necessary for the 
continued success of its enforcement program.”16 The SEC believes that 
adopting a certain definition may impede its enforcement actions and prevent 
it from dealing with new market trends. Furthermore, the SEC contends that 
the adoption of a definition will not increase the sanctions that are allowed 
under securities anti-fraud provisions. These views are backed up by the 
American Law Institute and the American Bar Association, who contend that 
this issue should be left up to further judicial development and that it is hard 
to come up with an exclusive definition that can encompass Rule 10b–5 as it 
evolves. Then, if we do not have a definition for insider trading, how may we 
describe a certain action as being insider trading? 
Steinberg and Wang defined insider trading as “trading by anyone 
(inside or outside of the issuer) on any type of material nonpublic information 
about the issuer or about the market for the security.”17 Hence, insider trading 
is a generic term that applies to anyone, whether it is an individual or an entity, 
who lawfully or unlawfully obtains advantageous information—driven from 
inside the issuer or from the market about the issuer securities—and trades 
based on this information. Whether or not this trade constitutes trading “on the 
basis of material nonpublic information” will be determined under Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, thereunder. 
However, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not address all frauds that may 
committed in the business, but only those “in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security.” In other words, the fraud must somehow “touch” upon 
securities transactions.18 
B.     Whether or not Insider Trading Prohibition is Justified.  
Some securities scholars, as well as economists, argued that trading 
on nonpublic information may benefit stock market efficiency. We will survey 
the core views for those who believe that insider trading should be legalized 
and follow that with counterarguments that refute that assumption.  
1. Insider trading should be legal: 
The stock market dynamic, which may occur due to insiders’ 
transactions, led some economists to concentrate their views on short-term 
economic benefits rather than the principles of fairness. They stand for the 
legalization of insider trading, alleging that it is a reward for performance and 
creates a new entrepreneurial role in the market.  
                                                 
15 Id.  
16 Define Insider Trading, supra note 11. 
17 William Wang & Marc Steinberg, INSIDER TRADING 1 (2010).  
18 Id. at 200. 
 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW  VOL. XIII:II 
 
62
1.1 Insider trading is a reward for performance:  
Henry Manne believes that the attack on insider trading is, in fact, a 
war against free capital markets.19 He compares the insiders’ right to trade on 
their ideas and innovations with the patent system, which secures an exclusive 
right for the inventor.20 He says insider trading promotes innovation.21 Each 
smart employee is an entrepreneur, and his valuable ideas are his capital and 
should be put into practice to profit.22 As capital increases its rate of return, 
ideas should be compensated.23 He continues to say that, while corporations 
have other compensation tools, they are inadequate because they are set in 
advance, and fair compensation should match individual contributions.24 
Salary, special bonuses, or stock options are not compensatory enough to meet 
the ambition, enthusiasm, and self-confidence of employees and do not “serve 
the needs of the entrepreneur for the massive reward for great innovations.”25 
1.2 Insider trading will add more players to the market:  
Professor Manne also argues that insider trading allows any individual 
who works for a publicly traded corporation to play an entrepreneurial role, 
which is an important advantage.26 Individuals can, in effect, sell their own 
ideas without the necessity of having a large amount of capital available.27 This 
also serves as an economic function that benefits the corporation; it will allow 
imaginative employees to take risks and be less conservative.28  
Professor Manne’s thesis has been criticized through the years. 
Scholars responding to Manne’s thesis contend that insider trading is an 
inadequate method for compensating corporate managers. Initially, there are 
trading hedge rules for the stock market that limit risk. If we accept Professor 
Manne’s thesis, then insiders hoping for massive personal profit will devalue 
any trading rules, customs, and principles, and this could cause a disaster for 
the entire market. Easterbrook further explained that permitting insider trading 
practices would increase the number of people engaging in unreasonably risky 
business activities.29 He continued analyzing the inadequacy of presumed 
managers and the rewards system saying that there is a difference between 
                                                 
19 Henry G. Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, 44(6) HARV. BUS. REV. 
113 (1966).  
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary 
Privileges, and the Production of Information, SUP. CT. REV. 309, 332 (1981).  
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investors and managers in terms of risk factors related to stock prices.30 
Investors are free to invest in a portfolio to reduce risk, which makes them less 
sensitive to stock price volatility.31 However, because managers do not have 
the option to diversify, they are more sensitive to the volatility of stock 
prices.32 That leads us to the fact that “most managers would prefer the 
certainty of $100,000 salary to a salary of $50,000 and a 10 percent chance of 
a bonus of $500,000.”33  
Furthermore, permitting insider trading may become an incentive for 
managers to accept and tolerate losses and negative developments instead of 
striving to overcome them because they can benefit from bad news as well as 
good news.34 Finally, the positive contributions and developments that 
business managers bring to their corporations are closely examined and 
appreciated by the entire financial system. Big corporations will fight to hire 
smart managers, officers, and key employees whose activities add value to 
corporations no matter how expensive their salaries, bonuses, stock options, or 
other types of compensation are.35 Hence, saying that insider trading is the best 
and most adequate compensation method for corporate innovators is no longer 
plausible.  
1.3 Insider trading contributes to market efficiency:  
Carlton and Fischel argued that stock market efficiency is another 
reason to advocate for insider trading.36 They argued that insider trading plays 
the same role as disseminated information in terms of informing the 
shareholders and consequently influencing the price of stocks.37 They claim 
that when an insider trades, the stock price will reflect this change as if the 
information has been disclosed.38 The more disclosure for the identity of the 
insider, the closer the stock reflects its true price.39 This means corporations 
                                                 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id.  
34 Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal 
Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 5 (1982). 
35 Broadcom paid its CEO Hock Tan a total compensation package of 
$103.2 million. See Kathleen Elkins, Median CEO pay reaches $12.1 million – 
here’s how much the 4 highest-paid leaders earn, CNBC (May 9, 2018) 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/09/how-much-the-5-highest-paid-ceos-earn.html.    
36 Daniel R. Fischel and Dennis W. Carlton, The Regulation of Insider 
Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1982). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 U.S. brokerage firms publish corporation's insider transactions as an 
indicator to inform investors about stock's future price. See, ROBINHOOD, 
https://robinhood.com/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
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can control the stock price by controlling the communication of information 
through insider trading.  
The application of this theory is inapplicable because it assumes that 
insider trading is a disclosure tool; it assumes that the corporation utilizes 
insider trading to tell the shareholder and the interested public that 
developments occurred, so watch how the insiders trade and react accordingly. 
Also, this assumes that insiders always put their corporation’s interests before 
their personal interests, and that is rare in humans. Besides, what if an insider’s 
transactions were fabricated, intended only to manipulate the price, and there 
is no actual ground for price change? How would we assess the accuracy of 
this disseminated information as we do with prospectuses or corporations’ 
periodic reports? Who will be liable in cases of violations; the insider who 
traded or the corporation?  
2. Why insider Trading should be Prohibited? 
Securities literature presents four main policy justifications for 
prohibiting insider trading: fairness, market integrity, enhance prompt 
disclosure, and property protection.  
2.1 Insider trading is not fair:  
Insider trading is not fair because it harms the investor, the issuer, the 
bidder in cases of tender offers or mergers, and market participants, such as 
broker-dealers.40 Focusing our discussion over the first person affected by 
insider trading, we will look from the stockholder’s side. The fairness 
approach is based on the parity of information that should exist between two 
parties for any normal transaction. However, information parity does not 
mean—as the SEC proposed—that transaction parties should stand on the 
same level of knowledge, or “level playing field,” about the securities 
transactions.41 Instead, fairness means there is no asymmetry of information 
access to the securities forgo prices because of firm-specific information, not 
because of general market conditions.42 This means the issue is not the 
                                                 
40 Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
1053 (1977). The trial court in Fridrich v. Bradford, held that the insider trader had 
breached a duty to the entire market, and set damages representing the “losses” of all 
traders who had sold during the period from the insider's purchase until the 
disclosure. Id. 
41 “The law has no patience with plaintiffs who are foolish or overcautious.” 
Grant v. Attrill, 11 F. 469, 470 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882) (“The [plaintiff] seems to have 
preferred to sell rather than risk the management promised; and he sold out”); see 
Paula J. Dalley, From Horse Trading to Insider Trading: The Historical Antecedents 
of the Insider Trading Debate, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289 (1998).  
42 William J. Carney, Signaling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 Cath. 
U. L. Rev. 863 (1987). See also, Chief Justice Marshall’s notice in Laidlaw v. Organ, 
15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 195 (1817), if there is no superiority in terms of information 
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information asymmetry itself but how the information is obtained; trading 
based on good faith effort to understand the forego market prices is permitted, 
while trading based on stolen information is prohibited.43 Professor William J. 
Carney investigated the causation of investor injury because of insider 
trading.44 He concluded, “The loss of an investor is caused by the revelation 
of truthful information, which he or she lacked at the time of trading, and 
which causes the market to revalue the particular issuer's shares.”45 Whether 
the transaction was face-to-face or in person “investors are directly solicited, 
the insider has in fact induced the other person to transact with him or her, and 
causation is relatively clear.”46 The trial court in Fridrich v. Bradford, applied 
this understanding and held that the insider trader breached a duty to the entire 
market, and set damages representing the “losses” of all traders who had sold 
their stocks during the period from the insider's purchase until the disclosure.47 
The Court in United States v. O’Hagan stated, “A misappropriator who trades 
on the basis of material, nonpublic information, in short, gains his 
advantageous market position through deception; he deceives the source of the 
information and simultaneously harms members of the investing public.”48 
When insiders remain silent about material information pertaining to 
the transaction of their corporation’s securities, they commit deception and 
cheat the shareholders, who placed their trust and confidence in them and 
expected them to speak.49 Finally, saying that insider trading should be 
considered a reward for performance would open the door for fraud and affect 
market efficiency.  
2.2 Insider trading negatively affect market confidence: 
The Supreme Court in United States v. O’Hagan used very clear 
language to warn against how insider trading undermines investor confidence 
and impact negatively the entire economic system. The Court said, “Although 
informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely 
would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on 
misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law.” The Supreme 
Court also emphasized that “if the market is thought to be systematically 
populated with … transactors -trading on the basis of misappropriated 
information- some investors will refrain from dealing altogether, and others 
                                                 
accessibility “[i]t would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine within 
proper limits, where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties.” 
43 William J. Carney, Signaling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 863, 864 (1987). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).   
48 U.S. v. O’Hagan, 117 U.S. 2199 (1997). 
49 Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary 
Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315 (2009).  
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will incur costs to avoid dealing with such transactors or corruptly to overcome 
their unerodable informational advantages.” 50 
Furthermore, from an economic view, if insiders were allowed to 
transact based on inside knowledge they would induce or prevent a securities 
transaction that was not going to be executed if there was no insider trading. 
In the long run, these transactions cause stock market flow to shift from its 
economic normal format, and consequently widen the distance between the 
economic reality of stocks and its trading prices. This fictitious shift will cause 
stock prices to be either underpriced or overpriced and this will undermine 
market confidence. 
 Laura Beny conducted an empirical study on 33 countries, including 
highly developed and newly emerging stock markets.51 The study proved that 
countries that had a robust prohibitive system against insider trading enjoyed 
“ownership dispersion, stock price informativeness, and stock market 
liquidity.”52  
2.3 Prohibiting insider trading enhances prompt disclosure:53   
Disclosure plays a crucial role in building an efficient stock market. 
Market efficiency means that stock information—both public and private—is 
fully reflected in its prices. The more efficient markets can become, the more 
closely stocks’ intrinsic value is reflected in its prices. Corporations used to 
make selective disclosures to certain securities market professionals. These 
practices prompted the SEC to enact Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) to 
mandate public companies’ simultaneous disclosures to the public when 
corporate officials first made selective disclosures to a privileged few. This 
regulation applies to persons like brokers or dealers, investment advisers, 
personnel of an investment company, any persons who owe a duty of trust or 
confidence, or any other associated persons. Rule 100(b) of regulation FD 
allows disclosure to insiders or temporary insiders and exempts them from 
selective disclosure prohibitions. 
 Express liability of insider trading prompts, to a certain level, those 
who are potentially liable to make timely public disclosure, so they avoid 
potential charges. Hence, the point is that if insiders to the material nonpublic 
                                                 
50 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654.  
51 Laura N. Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the 
World: An Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, 
32 J. CORP. L. 237 (2007). 
52 Id. 
53 See the argument that insider trading plays the same role as disseminated 
information and the counterargument we presented. Supra Section 1.3.  
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information cannot trade while business secrets exit, they will be motivated to 
release information promptly and widely.  
 2.4 Prohibiting insider trading enhance private property protection:  
A corporation’s important nonpublic information is an intangible asset 
owned by the corporation and, by extension, to all of its shareholders. Title 
transfer of valuable information or an “intangible asset” or depleting it for the 
insiders’ private benefit is more or less a kind of property theft. The rationale 
for assigning property rights to valuable information for the stockholder or the 
corporation is the same as the rationale in prohibiting patent infringement.54  
Corporations will only be incentivized to innovate and engage in 
strategic decisions if they can capture the value of these investments without 
the fear of theft. Courts permit shareholders private action for insiders trading 
in order to protect shareholders’ property interest in a corporation’s nonpublic 
information.55 
II. THE OFFENSE OF INSIDER TRADING 
A. Classical and Misappropriation Theories in American Federal 
Courts, Fraud in Connection with the Purchase or Sale of Security 
Rule (10b-5). 
       Fraudulent nondisclosure was the earliest lawsuit shareholders 
brought in the United States courts against corporate officers.56 Although 
fraudulent conduct under common law requires an affirmative misstatement 
and reliance to prove fraud,57 courts recognized that, in certain circumstances, 
pure silence about material information could be sufficient to plead fraud.58 
One of these circumstances is when there is a fiduciary relationship between 
the two parties to a transaction. Courts, at this time, varied in evaluating these 
circumstances for what is called the “majority rule” and “minority rule.”  
Under the majority rule, insiders owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation only, 
not to the shareholders. This means insiders are free to use “material nonpublic 
                                                 
54 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent 
Choice between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 S.M.U. L. Rev. 
1589,1606–08 (1999).  
55 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d 228 (2nd Cir. 1974), the court 
accepted the implied cause of action of insider trading and limited the right of action 
to shareholders who had traded contemporaneously with the insider.  
56. Donna M. Nagy, Richard W. Painter, and Margaret V. Sachs, Securities 
Litigation and Enforcement: Cases and Materials, 4th Edition (2017). 
57 Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 195 (1817), Chief Justice 
Marshall stated parties to transactions have no affirmative duty of disclosure.  
58 Nagy, Painter, Sachs, supra note 56, at 490.    
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information” in transactions with the corporation’s shareholders without any 
disclosure obligations.59 Meanwhile, under the “minority rule,” insiders are 
fiduciaries for both the corporation and the shareholders and thus, insiders 
cannot remain silent about material nonpublic information.60 Yet, under the 
minority rule, there are still certain prerequisites for fiduciary obligation, like 
face-to-face transactions and transacting with a party who had a pre-existing 
relationship with the corporation. In Goodwin v. Agassiz,61 the court said an 
insider trading violation would not exist if the identity of the insider was 
unknown to the buyer (the shareholder) and there was no face-to-face 
transaction.  
      Before enacting the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), courts used to adjudicate 
securities fraud disputes under Common Law and the Criminal Code. 
The United States Supreme Court shaped and endorsed Classical and 
Misappropriation theories of insider trading in three cases: Chiarella v. United 
States62 in 1980, Dirks v. SEC63 in 1983, and United States v. O’Hagan64 in 
1997. We will closely examine these three cases through the coming chapter.  
1. The Classical Theory of Insider Trading  
Traditional, special relationship or classical theory were the terms that 
courts used to refer to the offense of insider trading when there was a 
relationship between the corporate insider and the buyer or seller of securities 
of that corporation.65 In Dirks v. SEC, the Supreme Court referred to a “special 
relationship” between the insider of the corporation and its shareholders.66  
                                                 
59 Bawden v. Taylor, 254 Ill. 464 (1912). The plaintiff prayed to set aside 
the stock sale under the Criminal Code, prohibiting gambling in stocks, the court 
said, “officer of corporation is not a trustee for stockholders as respects their stock.” 
Officers are trustees for the stockholders as a body not for an individual stockholder. 
Id. 
60 Dawson v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 157 N.W. 929, 938 (Iowa 1916). 
61. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (Mass. 1933). 
43 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Chiarella consider the 
source of the “classical” or “traditional” theory of insider trading liability. 
63 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
64 United Sates v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). Prior to O'Hagan, a 
majority of the Court had recognized Section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5 liability for 
insider trading only under the classical theory. See Donna M. Nagy, “Reframing the 
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O'Hagan Suggestion”, 
MAURER SCH. OF L. 1223 (1998). 
65 William K.S. Wang & Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading, 52 THE BUS. 
LAW. 1431 (1997). 
66 Wang & Steinberg, supra, note 17, at 291.  
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This special fiduciary relationship was the basis of the classical theory for 
insider trading.67  
The Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States defined the elements 
of insider trading under classical theory, which defines who the insider is, to 
whom the insider owes the fiduciary duty, and what the limits of their liabilities 
are.68  
The facts of Chiarella v. United States came as the petitioner, Vincent 
Chiarella, was employed by a financial printer that engaged to print corporate 
takeover materials.69 Chiarella deduced the names of the target corporation 
before receiving the true names on the final printing night.70 He purchased 
stock in the target companies and after the takeover went public, he profited 
from selling the purchased shares.71 After an SEC investigation, Chiarella 
entered into an agreement with the SEC to return the profits he made to the 
sellers of the shares.72 Thereafter, he was indicted and convicted for violating 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5—as the jury was instructed—because he 
willfully failed to disclose to the sellers of the target company the inside 
information about the forthcoming takeover bid.73  
1.1 The Supreme Court ruling on Chiarella:  
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit conviction and ruled 
that Chiarella’s conviction under Section 10(b) was improper because the 
liability under Section 10(b) is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from 
a relationship of trust between parties to a transaction.74 Because Chiarella was 
not an insider and did not owe the acquired corporation shareholders a duty to 
disclose, he also was not a fiduciary for the sellers of the target corporation 
because they had not placed their trust in him.75 The Supreme Court said 
Chiarella’s conviction could not be justified on the alternative theory under 
Rule 10b-5 that he breached a fiduciary duty to the acquiring corporation to 
whom Chiarella owed a duty of trust because such a theory was not presented 
to the jury.76  
                                                 
67 Zachary J. Gubler, A Unified Theory of Insider Trading Law, Harv. L. 
Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Sept. 30, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/30/a-unified-theory-of-insider-trading-law/. 
68 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222. 
69 Id. at 224. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 225. 
74 Id. at 236–37. 
75 Id. at 232–33. 
76 Id. at 236–37. 
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The Supreme Court said there is no such evidence from the language 
or the legislative history of Section 10(b) that can form such a broad disclosure 
duty between all participants in market transactions based on the mere 
possession of material, nonpublic information.77 Instead, there is a detailed 
securities regulation that recognizes when such use of nonpublic information 
may not harm the efficiency of the stock market.78  Hence, classical theory 
liability requires a duty to disclose, and that this duty arises from a relationship 
of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction. Since the sellers of the 
target corporation stocks did not put their trust in Chiarella, the Supreme Court 
reversed the indictment saying there was no “general duty between all 
participants in market transaction to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic 
information.”79 However, insiders such as officers and directors of the 
corporation whose stock is traded do owe such duties to the corporation’s 
shareholders.80 The Court left open the possibility of Chiarella’s indictment 
under other theories because they were not included in the jury instructions.  
 Justice Burger dissented saying the language of Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 which says “[A]ny person [engaged in] . . . any [fraudulent] 
scheme”81 would encompass any person who misappropriated nonpublic 
information, and that person has an absolute duty to disclose or abstain from 
trading. It is not only limited to corporate insiders.82   
1.2 Dirks v. SEC83 
In Dirks v. SEC, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Court of 
Appeals insider trading judgement against Dirks, who was an officer of a New 
York broker-dealer firm specialized in analysis of insurance companies’ 
securities.84 Ronald Secrist, a former officer of an insurance company 
incentivized by verifying and exposing fraud, gave Dirks inside information 
about how overstated his insurance company’s assets were.85 Based on 
Secrist’s information, Dirks started his own investigation and during this stage 
of investigation, he openly discussed that information with a number of his 
clients.86 Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded that insurance company’s 
stocks, but some of his clients sold their stocks based on his tips before the 
                                                 
77 Id. 
78 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. II 1976). Williams Act allows for a certain 
limit the bidder in tender offer to trade on the target corporation before announcing 
the tender offer.  
79 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 661. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236–37. 
83 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 649. 
86 Id. 
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stock price fell.87 The SEC charged Dirks with securities fraud under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, alleging that he aided and abetted his clients to sell their 
stocks in the insurance company based on material, nonpublic information 
conveyed by company insiders. 88 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Chiarella v. United States, 
acknowledged its violation elements,89 and added that Rule 10b-5 also requires 
a scheme of “manipulation or deception” to make personal profits.90 
1.3 Elements of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s Violation Under 
Classical Theory 
Chiarella set the precedent that a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 by corporate insiders requires a breach of a disclosure duty that arises 
from a relationship of trust and confidence between the transaction parties.91 
This requires, first, that the existence of such a relationship affords access to 
inside information intended to be available only for the corporation’s purposes, 
and second, that it will be unfair to allow a corporate insider—or a co-
participant—to take advantage of that information by trading without 
informing the victim. 
1.4 Can Silence Constitute a Manipulative or Deceptive Device? 
 Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 require the use of a “deceptive device” 
in connection with a securities transaction to be charged with insider trading. 
At this point, can pure silence be sufficient to plead securities fraud under 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, thereunder?  
Neither the language of Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 answers this 
question. The Second Circuit found in Frigitemp Corp. v. Fin. Dynamics Fund, 
Inc. that “the party charged with failing to disclose market information must 
be under a duty to disclose.”92 Thus, silence in connection with securities 
transactions may be considered fraud under Section 10(b) when there is a duty 
to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between 
                                                 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 650–51. 
89 Id. at 646–47. There are “[t]wo elements for establishing a violation of § 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by corporate insiders [which] are the existence of a 
relationship affords access to inside information intended to be available only for 
corporate purpose, and the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take 
advantage of that information by trading without disclosure.” Id.  
90 Id. at 647.  
91 Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222. 
92 Frigitemp Corp v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 282 (2d 
Cir. 1975). 
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transaction parties.93 In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, the Court held 
that the bank agent had a duty to inform its mixed-blood Indian customers that 
their shares could be sold for a higher price on a non-Indian market. 94 The 
bank agent’s duty to inform arose from the trust that the Indian customers 
placed in him.95 Hence, silence may constitute a manipulative or deceptive 
device when there is a relationship of reliance and trust.   
1.5 Who is an Insider Under Classical Theory?  
The Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC indicated that liability under the 
classical theory applies to not only officers, directors, and other permanent 
insiders of the corporation, but also to "temporary insiders" or "quasi-insiders," 
such as attorneys, accountants, and investment bankers who become 
temporary fiduciaries of the corporation.96 In Dirks, the Supreme Court 
developed the idea of temporary insiders, stating that  
[u]nder certain circumstances, such as where corporate 
information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, 
accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation, 
these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. 
The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that 
such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but 
rather that they have entered into a special confidential 
relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and 
are given access to information solely for corporate purposes.97   
 
 Further, the issuer may be included in the circle of classical theory 
and treated as an insider. Courts have treated corporations trading on the basis 
of inside information to benefit the corporation itself as any person subject to 
the disclose or abstain rule.98  
1.6 Possession vs. Use 
Under the classical theory, liability requires insider trading to take 
place while “in possession of” material, nonpublic information. However, 
                                                 
93 Nagy, Painter, Sachs, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 517.    
94 Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152–53 
(1972).  
95 Id. 
96 463 U.S. at 655. 
97  Id. at n.14.  
98 The term “insider” is also used to describe persons such as attorneys, and 
other professionals who work as temporary agents of the corporation (sometimes 
termed “temporary insiders” or “quasi-insiders”). See Wang & Steinberg, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 303; see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222.  
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questions remain whether one must possess material, nonpublic information in 
all occasions and whether one must disclose or abstain from trading, if one is 
only barred from using this information in trading. Whether liability for insider 
trading under Rule 10b-5 should be determined pursuant to a “knowing 
possession” test or a “use” test is still debated.99  
In SEC v. Adler100 and United States v. Smith,101 the two federal courts 
rejected the SEC possession standard and ruled that Rule 10b-5 only prohibits 
trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information.102 Therefore, if a 
person trades while in the possession of material, nonpublic information, the 
government still needs to prove that the person actually used the inside 
information in a trading decision.  
  However, in United States v. Teicher,103 the Second Circuit reached 
the opposite ruling and stipulated “a knowing possession” for three reasons: 
first, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 only require that a deceptive practice be 
conducted “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security”—the “in 
connection with” clause must be “construed flexibly to include deceptive 
practices ‘touching’ the sale of securities.”104 Second, a “knowing possession” 
standard comports with the maxim that one with a fiduciary or similar duty to 
hold material, nonpublic information in confidence must either “disclose or 
abstain.”105 Finally, a “knowing possession” standard has the attribute of 
simplicity, recognizing that one who trades while knowingly possessing 
material, inside information has an informational advantage over other 
traders.106  
The SEC did not wait for this conflict to be solved through case-by-
case adjudication. The SEC opted to use its authority under Section 10(b) to 
promulgate Rule 10b-5-1 to endorse a “knowing possession”107 with an 
affirmative defense in Rule 10b-5-1(c)(1)(i), which provides that a purchase 
                                                 
99 Nagy, Painter, Sachs, supra note 56, at 546.  
100 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998). 
101 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).  
102 The court summarized the SEC’s position stating that  
[t]he Commission also believes that Rule 10b–5 does not 
require a showing that an insider sold his securities for the purpose 
of taking advantage of material nonpublic information . . . . If an 
insider sells his securities while in possession of material adverse 
non-public information, such an insider is taking advantage of his 
position to the detriment of the public.  
See Report of the Investigation In the Matter of Sterling Drug Inc., 
SEC Release No. 14675 (April 14, 1978).   
103 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Nagy, Painter, Sachs, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 
517. 
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or sale is not “on the basis of” material, nonpublic information if there was a 
predetermined plan for the sale or purchase of securities. This includes 
entering into a good faith, binding contract for the sale or purchase of 
securities, instructing another person to transact on the account owner’s behalf, 
or adopting a written plan for trading securities.108   
2. The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading  
The misappropriation theory was introduced to protect the integrity of 
security markets from outsiders who have access to a corporation’s secrets but 
owe no fiduciary duty to the corporation’s shareholders.  
According to the misappropriation theory, one commits insider trading 
securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 
10b-5 when one, “in connection with” a securities transaction, misappropriates 
confidential information in a breach of duty of loyalty and confidentiality 
owed to the source109of information who owns the exclusive use of that 
information.  
2.1 United States v. O’Hagan110 
In United States v. O’Hagan, the United States Supreme Court was 
confronted with similar facts as in Chiarella v. United States, but in O’Hagan, 
the court was not restricted by limited jury instructions.  
James O’Hagan was a partner in the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney 
that was hired to represent Grand Metropolitan PLC on a potential tender 
offer.111 While Dorsey & Whitney law firm was still retained to represent 
Grand Metropolitan, O’Hagan started purchasing call options for the target 
company stocks.112 When the tender offer was publicly announced, O’Hagan 
sold his stock for a profit of $4.3 million.113 The SEC charged O’Hagan, inter 
alia, for misappropriating material, nonpublic information for personal benefit 
and defrauding Grand Metropolitan PLC and the Dorsey & Whitney law firm 
who was working for the bidder.114 The indictment charged O’Hagan with the 
violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for fraudulent trading in connection 
                                                 
108 See Rule 10b-5-1(c)(1)(i). 
109 Professor Nagy suggests a broader “fraud on investors” version of the 
misappropriation theory, she says investors in the marketplace are also deceived and 
defrauded when a person purchases or sells securities based on material, nonpublic 
information that has been misappropriated from the information's source. See Nagy, 
Donna M., "Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A 
Post-O'Hagan Suggestion" (1998). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 615., at 1223. 
110 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642. 
111 Id. at 647. 
112 Id. at 647–48. 
113 Id. at 648. 
114 Id. at 648–49. 
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with a tender offer in violation of Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act and SEC 
Rule 14e-3(a).115 O’Hagan was convicted and sentenced to prison.116 
 The Eighth Circuit reversed O’Hagan’s conviction, holding that 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability may not be grounded on the 
misappropriation theory.117 Further, the Eighth Circuit said misappropriation 
theory is inconsistent with Section 10(b), and under Chiarella and Dirks 
ruling, “Only a breach of a duty to parties to a securities transaction, or, at the 
most, to other market participants such as investors, will be sufficient to give 
rise to § 10(b) liability.”118  
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Eighth 
Circuit decision and ruled that a person who trades in securities for personal 
profit, using confidential information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary 
duty to the source of the information, will be found guilty of violating Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.119 The United States Supreme Court said the Eighth 
Circuit erred in holding that the misappropriation theory is inconsistent with 
Section 10(b) because the deceptive nondisclosure is essential to Section 10(b) 
liability under the theory. Hence, it was O’Hagan’s failure to disclose his 
personal trading to Grand Met and Dorsey while he is required to speak that 
made his conduct “deceptive” under Section 10(b).    
The Supreme Court further explained that  
[i]n lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship 
between company insider and purchaser or seller of the 
company’s stock, the misappropriation theory premises 
liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who 
entrusted him with access to confidential information.”120 The 
misappropriation theory bars only “trading on the basis of 
information that the wrongdoer converted to his own use in 
violation of some fiduciary, contractual, or similar obligation 
to the owner or rightful possessor of the information.121 
 
                                                 
115 Id. at 649. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 661. 
119 Id. at 665–66. 
120 Id. at 653. 
121 Id. at 665. 
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2.2 Elements of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s Violation Under 
Misappropriation Theory. 
The Supreme Court in O’Hagan emphasized three elements: (1) 
deceptive conduct of material nonpublic information, (2) in connection with a 
securities transaction, and (3) scienter and willfulness in criminal action.122 
The Court affirmed and endorsed the criminal liability under Section 10(b) on 
the misappropriation theory.123 The court held that liability under 
misappropriation theory meant that a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violation 
occurred when an outsider traded based on nonpublic, confidential information 
in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information, rather than 
to the person with whom he traded.124 O’Hagan emphasized that section 10(b) 
liability requires deceptive conduct of material nonpublic information, in 
connection with a securities transaction, and scienter.125    
i. First Element: Deceptive Conduct  
The Supreme Court defined deception as “[a] fiduciary who pretends 
loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the principal’s information 
for personal gain dupes or defrauds the principal.”126 So, if the fiduciary 
informed the source of information that he planned to trade based on secret 
information he had, there is no deceptive device and, consequently, the liability 
under misappropriation theory will be foreclosed because there is no 
“deceptive device.”127   
ii. Second Element: In Connection with the Purchase or Sale of 
Security  
The misappropriation’s deceptive use must be “in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securit[y],” which means that information had to be used 
in purchasing or selling securities and not for any other uses.128 In SEC v. 
                                                 
122 Id. at 643. 
123 Id. at 652. 
124 Id. 
125 In Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013), 
investors brought putative class action against corporation and individual officers 
and directors alleging securities fraud. The court enumerated six elements of an 
implied § 10(b) cause of action for securities fraud: (1) a material misrepresentation 
or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the 
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance 
upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.  
126 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 642. 
127 Id. at 653. 
128 Id. at 658. 
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Clark,129 the court said Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not proscribe all 
frauds occurring in the business world, only those “in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.”130 
iii. Third Element: Scienter and Willfulness in Criminal Action  
Scienter is a required element in every case involving fraud that 
esteems from the common law and Rule 10b-5 adopts that element whether 
the SEC or U.S. attorney brings the insider trading case.131 However, in 
prosecuting insider trading, criminally proving willfulness conduct is required 
in addition to scienter.132 The United States Supreme Court defined Scienter in 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud.”133  
The Supreme Court in O’Hagan concluded that misappropriation 
theory was consistent with the statute and precedent and establishing criminal 
violation of Rule 10b-5 under the misappropriation theory would require 
proving the presence of culpable intent (scienter), which means that the 
defendant “willfully” and with knowledge of Rule 10b-5 committed the 
violation.134 The defendant will not be imprisoned if he can prove his lack of 
knowledge of the rule.135   
Hence, the scienter element is necessary to prove violation of Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.136 Negligence will not suffice to constitute a violation 
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5; however, actual intent will satisfy this 
element.137 The overwhelming majority of the circuit courts concluded that 
recklessness is also enough in non-criminal cases.138 Some courts established 
a three elements formula for scienter of an insider trading case.139 The three 
elements are actual knowledge of nonpublic, material information, knowledge 
that the information was undisclosed, and knowledge that the information was 
material.140 If the liability of insider trading was based on the misappropriation 
theory, the tippee must also know that the tipper disclosed the inside, 
                                                 
129 SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990). 
130 Id. 
131 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 66566. 
132 Id. 
133 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).  
134 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665–66. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 666. 
138 Wang & Steinberg, supra note 17, at 42. 
139 Id.; see SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983). 
140 MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47.  
 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW  VOL. XIII:II 
 
78
nonpublic information on a breach of fiduciary duty to the source of 
information.141 
B. The Concept of Tipping Under Dirks v. SEC142 (1983) and Salman 
v. United States143 (2016)144 
Tipping occurs when an insider passes on information that he knows is 
material and nonpublic to an outsider, in violation of a fiduciary duty to the 
issuer or the source of the information.145 The United States Supreme Court 
established a test for securities fraud responsibility of the person who receives 
material, nonpublic information in Dirks and reaffirmed this test in Salman v. 
United States.146 We are going to define the concept of tipping and the element 
of personal benefits.  
1. Tipping Under Dirks v. SEC (1983) 
The United States Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC  extended the 
liability of insider trading to the temporary employee or agent of the 
corporation and to persons “called tippees” and made them obliged under the 
disclose or abstain rule.147 A tippee is a person who receives information from 
the “tipper” in breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders.148 The court made it 
clear that if a tippee trades on nonpublic information received from an insider 
or someone who, in turn, received it from an insider “tipper,” and the “tippee” 
knows that the information was disclosed in violation of the tipper’s fiduciary 
duty, he might be found liable for committing insider trading under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.149 The Court defined tippees as “those individuals who 
trade securities of a company while in possession of material, nonpublic 
information about that company (a “tip”) that was conveyed by a corporate 
insider in violation of his fiduciary duty to the company’s shareholders.”150 
That means the tippee, by obtaining the tip, will inherit a derivative obligation 
                                                 
141 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 673–78. 
142 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
143 Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).  
144 We did not discuss tipping as a classical theory problem and 
misappropriation problem separately. When the tipper violates a fiduciary duty to the 
issuer, this will be a classical theory of insider trading, and when the tipper violates a 
duty to the source of information, that will be misappropriation theory. Many times, 
the two theories come together because when a tipper violates a fiduciary duty to the 
issuer, the issuer is also the source of information. 
145 Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1978). 
146 137 S. Ct. at 420. 
147 DoNagy, supra note 49, at 1317. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).  
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of fiduciary duty to the company’s shareholders from the tipper, and that 
obligation requires the tippee to adhere to the disclose or abstain rule, same as 
the insider. The question before the Supreme Court was whether or not Dirks, 
as a tippee, violated anti-fraud laws by disclosing the material information he 
received from the tipper to his clients. 151 
The Court set an objective criterion in Dirks saying “the tippee” would 
be held liable under the disclose or abstain rule if the “tip” breached a fiduciary 
duty and that breach occurred for the sake of personal benefits.152 Since the 
insurance company former insider (the tipper) did not breach his fiduciary duty 
to the company’s shareholders by providing insider information to the tippee, 
the tippee does not inherit the duty to disclose or abstain and there is no 
derivative breach. 153  
The Court said that determining if a disclosure is a breach of duty 
depends, in large part, on the purpose of the disclosure, which means scienter 
is an independent element of a Rule 10b-5 violation under classical theory. 154 
The Court said not all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a 
securities transaction come within the ambit of Rule 10b–5.155 The tipper may 
disclose inside information, but still act consistently with his fiduciary duty.156 
For instance, if the tipper does not anticipate that the tippee will trade on the 
basis of disclosed information or the tipper does not recognize that the tip is 
material and may constitute nonpublic information.  
So, the manipulation or deception element is required to constitute 
unfairness when the insider takes advantage of information intended to be 
available only for a corporation’s purposes. The tippee’s responsibility must 
be related back to the insider’s responsibility by showing that the tippee knew 
that the information was given to him in breach of a fiduciary duty to the 
stockholder (under classical theory) or to the source of information (under 
misappropriation theory).157 
 In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or 
abstain, it is necessary to determine whether the insider’s “tip” constitutes a 
breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty.158  
                                                 
151 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648 (1983). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 663–64. 
155 Id. at 664 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 661. 
158 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 669.  
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Dirks adopted—but read it differently than SEC—the Cady, 
Roberts159 formulation of the breach of duty in which the transmission of 
information that was made available only for a corporate purpose for personal 
benefits, with the intent and knowledge that the individual is going to trade.  
The Dirks court also emphasized the Chiarella ruling saying that there 
can be no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside 
information “was not [the corporation’s] agent . . . was not a fiduciary, [or] 
was not a person in whom the sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust 
and confidence.”160 This does not mean the tippee is free to trade. The tippee 
might inherit the tipper’s liability if the tip was in breach of the tipper’s 
fiduciary liability. Since the tip does not breach the former insider fiduciary 
obligation to the insurance company, petitioner—Dirks—who received the 
material, nonpublic information from an “insider” of a corporation with which 
he had no connection, does not inherit the insider liability.161 Besides, the 
tipper was motivated by a desire to expose fraud, received no monetary or 
personal benefit from revealing the information, and their purpose to make a 
gift of valuable information to the petitioner.162 Thus, there was no actionable 
violation of anti-fraud provisions of federal securities laws resulting from the 
petitioner’s disclosure to his clients who relied on it in trading shares of the 
corporation.163 
2. Why the Supreme Court Vacated Court of Appeal Dirks Finding of 
Illegal Insider Trading:  
First, from Ronald Secrist’s (the tipper’s) side, there was no 
culpability in sharing the nonpublic information with Dirks because the tipper 
believed that the information was transmitted for a proper purpose (exposing 
the company fraud) and he did not receive or expect to receive a direct or 
indirect personal benefit from his disclosure.164  
 Second, from Dirks’ side, initially he did not owe the company 
stockholders a fiduciary duty and there is no fiduciary duty breach to be 
inherited from the insider.165 Besides, the manipulative and deceptive element 
were not clear from Dirks’ actions, it seems that the court interpreted Dirks’ 
disclosure to some of his clients as incidental in his main purpose of striving 
                                                 
159 In Re Cady & Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). In this case the court 
held that the defendant tippees did not violate any fiduciary duties concerning stock 
purchases where the SEC failed to prove that an insider revealed information for an 
“improper purpose.” Id. 
160 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 645.  
161 Id. at 671–72. 
162 Id. at 672. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 676. 
165 Id. at 665. 
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to expose fraudulent corporate practices.166 That means there is no scienter, 
which is necessary to prove the violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.167 
3. Personal Benefits Test Under Dirks  
The United State Supreme Court used the language of personal 
benefits, personal gains, or personal advantage to hold the tipper liable of 
insider trading and, consequently, the derivative responsibility of the tippee.168 
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or abstain 
from using nonpublic, material information received from an insider, the Court 
said it depends on whether the insider himself has breached his Cady, Roberts 
duty to shareholders in disclosing the nonpublic information to the tippee.169 
Since the insider did not personally benefit, directly or indirectly, from his 
disclosure, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders and, consequently, 
there is no tippee derivative breach.170 Thus, the Dirks test is whether the 
insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.171  
4. Tipping Under Salman v. United States (2016) 
Salman v. United States was the fourth Supreme Court insider trading 
case after Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan. The Supreme Court endorsed and 
outlined classical theory of insider trading in Chiarella.172 In Dirks, the 
Supreme Court extended insider trading liability to the tippee and set a test for 
the personal benefit element.173 Finally, in O’Hagan, the Court endorsed 
misappropriation of insider trading.174 
In Salman v. United States, the source of information was Maher Kara, 
a former investment banker at Citigroup.175 Maher shared inside information 
with his brother, Michael Kara, who, in turn, shared this information with his 
friend and relative-by-marriage, Salman.176 Michael told Salman that the 
source of information was his brother, Maher.177 Salman was indicted for 
federal securities fraud crimes for trading on inside information.178 Maher 
testified at Salman’s trial that he shared inside information with his brother, 
                                                 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 667. 
169 Id. at 653. 
170 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665. 
171 463 U.S. 646 at 664. 
172 Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222. 
173 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
174 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665. 
175 Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 421. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
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Michael, to benefit him and expected him to trade on it.179 Michael testified to 
sharing that information with Salman, who knew that it was from Maher.180 
The main issue in the Salman case is that Maher, the initial tipper, did not 
receive any pecuniary benefits from his tips as the Dirks test requires.181 
5. In Salman v. United States, the Supreme Court Abrogated Second 
Circuit Ruling  
            The Supreme Court in Salman v. United States did not follow the 
minority ruling set by the Second Circuit in United States v. Newman,182 and 
reaffirmed Dirks and rules that Maher breached his duty of trust and 
confidence to Citigroup and its clients, he was under the duty of trust and 
confidence of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and he shall not tip inside 
corporate information to others who he knows will trade on his tips.183 Further, 
Maher personally benefited by making a gift of inside corporate information 
to his brother.184 The facts even stated that Maher asked his brother Michael 
why he needed the information.185 Michael answered he owed someone 
money.186 The Supreme Court read this as quid pro quo of the gift.187 Michael 
substituted money and turned down Maher’s money offer, preferring the 
information.188 The Court found this a sufficient personal benefit for the tipper, 
and his advantage was that he was able to give a gift with someone else’s 
property, so the tip saved him money.189 Further, Salman committed securities 
fraud by trading on an insider tip in disregard of his knowledge that the tipper’s 
tip violated his fiduciary duty under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.190  
                                                 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 422. 
182 In United States v. Newman, the Second Circuit held that a “gift” of 
inside information could not be sufficient to plead insider trading unless there is 
‘‘proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship’’ between tipper and tippee that 
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a 
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature. See Nicole Vanatko, The 
Latest Chapter in Insider Trading Law: Major Circuit Decision Expands Scope of 
Liability for Trading on a “Tip”, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2017), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10028.pdf. 
183 Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 421. 
184 Id. at 422. 
185 Id. at 424. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 425. 
188 Id. at 424. 
189 Id. at 426. 
190 Id. at 428. 
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The Court also rules that scienter and willfulness from the tipper’s side 
exist when there are beliefs, anticipation, knowledge, or understanding that the 
tippee will trade based on the inside information.191   
6. Can a Gift Suffice the Personal Gains Test?  
Dirks answered, yes. “The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation 
of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”192 Dirks’ language is 
extremely specific in determining when it would be proper to convict for 
insider trading when an insider makes a gift of confidential information. 
Tippers do not have to receive a monetary or tangible personal benefit, it does 
not have to be quid pro quo from the tippee to the tipper, but it will be sufficient 
when the tipper makes a gift to the tippee and, in particular, a relative or 
friend.193 However, the personal benefit element does not include accidentally 
or unwillingly transferring information and, in this circumstance, the tippee 
might be liable if the other elements of the violation exist.  
Final Thoughts in Understanding Insider Trading and the Legal Justification 
of Prohibition  
            The main difference between insider trading liability under classical 
and misappropriation theory is that: 
The two theories are complementary, each addressing efforts 
to capitalize on nonpublic information through the purchase 
or sale of securities. The classical theory targets a corporate 
insider’s breach of duty to shareholders with whom the insider 
transacts; the misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the 
basis of nonpublic information by a corporate “outsider” in 
breach of a duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source 
of the information.194 
                                                 
191 Id. at 423. 
192 Dirks, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983). The petitioner lawyer defended this 
understanding saying these are dictum and the holding is far different and dictum 
shall not be used to be the basis for criminal liability, the supreme court justice 
responded on the bench and said “[b]ut it is not a dictum when it says thus the test is 
whether the insider personally will benefit directly or indirectly from his disclosure.” 
Id.  
193 Id. 
194 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653. 
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In other words, “The offense in classical theory is on the person who transacted 
with the insider, while in misappropriation theory the offense is on the source 
of the material nonpublic information.”195   
If banning insider trading increases market efficiency and there is a public 
interest in attaining efficiency of securities markets, it becomes a public 
interest issue. Protecting that public interest from violation makes the violation 
a public-order crime, which can be defined as a “crime which involves acts 
that interfere with the operations of society and the ability of people to function 
efficiently.”196 There is no doubt that the stock market nowadays is the 
backbone of the financial systems of many countries, including the United 
States. If there is any interference with the soundness of the operation of that 
market, the entire society will be affected, even for those who did not own 
securities.197 Hence, insider trading should be prohibited because it is a public-
order crime.  
           Rule14e-3 is a specific insider trading rule adopted by the SEC that only 
applies in the context of tender offer and this paper does not discuss that 
specific insider trading rule.198 
                                                 
195 Donna Nagy, Securities Regulations Class Spring 2018, Ind. L. J. 
(referencing O’Hagan 521 U.S. at 642).  “Under the ‘traditional’ or ‘classical theory’ 
of insider trading liability, a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 occurs when a 
corporate insider trades in his corporation’s securities on the basis of material, 
confidential information he has obtained by reason of his position. Such trading 
qualifies as a ‘deceptive device’ because there is a relationship of trust and 
confidence between the corporation’s shareholders and the insider . . . 
‘misappropriation theory’ urged by the [g]overnment here, a corporate ‘outsider’ 
violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 when he misappropriates confidential information 
for securities trading purposes, in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of 
the information, rather than to the persons with whom he trades.” Id.  
196. Larry J. Siegel, CRIMINOLOGY: THEORIES, PATTERNS, & TYPOLOGIES, 
(9th ed. 2006). 
197 See J. William Hicks, International Dimensions of U.S. Securities Law 
(2018) (“There is a public interest in national property resources so the long-term 
financial security of its important resources, also has interest in capital availability 
which secure flow of new capital into private enterprise, and public has interest in 
economic health . . . 1929 and 1987 market crash proved that there is a relationship 
between securities market and the nation as a whole.”).  
198 For a detailed analysis for Rule14e-3, see Jesse M. Fried, Insider 
Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
421 (2000).  
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C. Criminalization Under Egyptian Capital Market Law, Express 
Statutory Prohibition Not Defined as Fraud. 
1. Background on the Egyptian Legal System and its Stock Market:   
Islamic law and Napoleonic Code, which in turn derived its principles 
from Islamic law,199 formed the origins of the Egyptian legal system.200 Egypt 
is a civil law country, which means a court’s ruling is built on codes and 
administrative orders, not on case law as in the United States. However, 
previous judicial decisions of higher courts do have persuasive authority,201 
especially when the laws governing the dispute at hand are elastic. The most 
related securities law in the Egyptian legal system are: Companies Law No. 
159 of 1981, the Capital Market Law No. 95 of 1992 and its Executive 
Regulation, the Law of Non-Banking Financial Markets No. 10 of 2009, 
Central Depository Law No. 93 of 2000, related executive orders of the 
chairman of Egyptian Stock Exchange, and related orders of the chairman of 
Financial Regulatory Authority. Article 27 of Capital Market Law (CML) 95 
of 1992 allows for the establishment of Egyptian and foreign securities 
companies conducting one or more of the following activities:202 
(1) Underwriting of subscriptions; 
(2) Participation in the establishment of companies issuing securities; 
(3) Venture capital; 
(4) Clearing and settling of securities; 
(5) Forming and managing securities portfolios and mutual funds;  
(6) Acting as brokerage firms; 
(7) Securitization; and   
(8) Direct investment including hedge fund.203 
                                                 
199 See La Civilisation des arabes et l’étude scientifique de l’histoire, Revue 
Scientifique, 1er décembre 1883. It says that when Napoleon Bonaparte was in 
Egypt, he took a book for the Islamic Mālikī school and developed his 
“Napoleonic Code” on the basis of that Islamic school jurisprudence. Id.  
200 Ahmed Y. Zohny, Suitability of US Security Laws and Regulations to 
Serve as a Model Law for Egyptian Financial Markets, 15 ARAB L. Q. 5 (2000).  
201 For more details about Egyptian law, Court System, and government 
branches see Mohamed S. E. Abdel Wahab, An Overview of the Egyptian Legal 
System and Legal Research, GLOBALEX (2012) 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Egypt1.html.  For more details about 
Egyptian laws affecting economic activity see Radwa S. Elsaman, Doing Business in 
Egypt After the January Revolution: Capital Market and Investment Laws, 11 RICH. 
J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 43 (2011), http://scholarship.richmond.edu/global/vol11/iss1/3.  
202 Law No. 95 of 1992 (L aw of Capital Market); Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya 
Adad 10 mokrer-h, March 14, 2018 (Egypt). 
203 Added by the order of the Ministry of Investment and International 
Cooperation no. 113 for 2018, item 4 of the order regulates hedge fund saying, 
“direct investment company may add up the hedge fund activities to its purposes.”   
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Under Egyptian securities regulations, there are civil, administrative, 
and criminal sanctions for securities fraud, and several entities are authorized 
to enforce these sanctions. Law No. 120 for 2008 established “Economic 
Courts” as a special court to quickly resolve business disputes and to guarantee 
adjudicating this kind of case through an experienced judge. 
To unify the supervisory authority over the entire Egyptian non-
banking financial markets, Article 3 of Law No. 10 of 2009 replaced the 
Capital Market Authority with the Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA)204 to 
be in charge of enforcing the provisions of CML 95 of 1992. The FRA is an 
independent surveillance authority over the Egyptian stock market. Under 
Rule 902(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, Egyptian Exchange (EGX) is an 
offshore securities market.205  
The Capital Markets Law No. 95 of 1992 and its Executive Regulation 
did not define explicitly what constitutes a security. At this point, Egyptian 
commercial law or any related law will be applicable to define what constitute 
securities. Some argue that declining to define securities is a wise and 
pragmatic approach taken by the Egyptian legislator to expand the coverage of 
securities for its growing market.206 
The Egyptian legislature appeals to the principle of honesty, which is 
very much drawn from Islamic law and describes activities that are not in 
conformity with principles of honesty.207  
 Article 63 of the CML provides a wide anti-fraud provision to 
criminalize any activities that might affect the integrity and efficiency of the 
Egyptian stock market. It criminalizes practicing any activity of the capital 
market without being licensed or going beyond the scope of the license, public 
offering of any securities in violation of the CML, misstatement or omission 
of material information either when dealing with government officials or the 
trading public, and listing securities in stock exchange in violation of stock 
market regulations.  
                                                 
204 We may also refer to FRA by Egyptian Financial Supervision Authority 
(EFSA). See Explanatory, FIN. REG. AUTHORITY, 
http://www.fra.gov.eg/content/efsa_en/efsa_pages_en/efsa_clarification_en.htm (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
205 See Letter from Paul M. Dudek, Chief, Office of Int’l Corp. Fin., to Dr. 
Sameh El Torgoman, Chairman, Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchs. (Apr. 16, 2003) 
(available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/cairo041603.htm).  
206 See Zohny, supra note 200.   
207 Id.  
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Article 17 of the CML stipulated that listed securities must be traded 
on the stock exchange, and any sale that occurred outside of it would be 
deemed void.   
The Executive Regulation of the CML stipulated that securities 
transactions on the stock exchange must be executed through a brokerage firm. 
Article 89 of the CML executive regulation enumerates the conditions that 
should be satisfied on any broker, which includes a good reputation and never 
being convicted of a crime that negates his honor or integrity. The executive 
regulation also established a responsibility for the Egyptian Exchange to 
oversee its employees and to report any violations to the FSA. Article 90 
thereafter explained the brokerage firm duties from the moment it receives the 
customer’s order, prohibited any action that may cause damage to transacted 
persons, and forbid the execution of transactions for its own account.208 
Toward a new financial reform plan, in February 2018, the Egyptian 
Parliament approved amendments to the CML. The amendments established a 
legislative framework for the Sukuk market in Egypt, created an exchange for 
trading in derivatives (including futures, options, and swaps), and expanded 
the scope of criminal violations under the CML. The Egyptian capital market 
became more active because of the overall increased attractiveness of 
investment in Egypt after floating the Egyptian pound in November 2016, and 
there are many relatively big initial public offerings (IPOs) going on.209 The 
World Bank report for 2018 referred to positive developments in the Egyptian 
market. For instance, Egypt strengthened minority investors’ protections by 
increasing corporate transparency, improving one-stop shopping, and making 
it easier to start a new business.210 
2. Statutory Prohibition of Insider Trading Under Egyptian Law  
In comparison to the United States, Egyptian insider trading law has 
enough of a parity of information prohibition similar to the system in the 
United States prior to 1980 when the Supreme Court decided Chiarella. That 
means Egyptian law currently adopts the Second Circuit ruling in SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co.211 that bars any person in possession of material nonpublic 
information from trading or tipping.  
                                                 
208 Minister of Economics and Foreign Trade Decree No. 135 of 1993 
(Executive Regulations of the Capital Market Law), Al Jarida’ al-Rasmiyya, art. 90 
(vol. 81 F. no. 8 1993) (Egypt).  
209 Al Tamimi & Company, Equity Capital Markets in Egypt, LEXOLOGY 
(Sept. 4, 2018),  https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=07fb3eaa-db1f-
45ac-b050-193888f847a6. 
210 WORLD BANK GROUP, DOING BUSINESS 17, 19 (16th ed. 2019). 
211 SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d. Cir. 1968). The United 
States Supreme Court in Chiarella refused the Second Circuit ruling and emphasized 
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Article 64 of the Egyptian CML (translated from Arabic) stipulates 
that:  
Without prejudice to any heavier penalty stipulated in any 
other law; imprisonment for a term not less than two years and 
a fine of not less than fifty thousand Egyptian pounds 
(LE.50,000) or the amount of realized gains or avoided loss 
and not exceed twenty million (LE. 20,000,000) or the greater 
of twice the amount of realized gains or the avoided loss, or 
either penalty shall be inflicted on whomsoever divulges 
inside information received by virtue of his duties according 
to the provisions of this law, or benefits whether himself, his 
spouse, or his children, or inserts material misstatement in his 
official reports, or disregards any material information, to the 
extent that it affects the results of such reports, or trade on 
securities in violation of the provisions of Article No. 20 
(Mokrer)212 of this law.213 
In turn, Article No. 20 (Mokrer) of the CML added by Law No. 123 
for 2008 states 
It shall be prohibited for any person who have on his position 
material nonpublic information which could impact the status 
of any listed company to trade on its stock before this 
information became public, and it is also prohibited to tip or 
disclose this nonpublic information to any person directly or 
indirectly, the Executive Regulation of this law and stock 
exchange listing regulations shall determine what constitute a 
material nonpublic information.214 
Article 319 of the Executive Regulation defined what might constitute 
material information, inside information, insiders, and insider trading as 
follows:215 
B) Material information: A single piece or set of information that might have 
actual impact on listed stocks prices, had actual impact on investment 
decisions of investors, or had an effect on market transactions of stocks. 
                                                 
that there is no express disclose or abstain obligation—it all goes to the fiduciary 
duty.  
212 Mokrer is an Arabic term that means bis, reiterated, or repeated.  
213 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya 
Adad 10 mokrer-h (2018) (Egypt). 
214 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya 
Adad 23 mokrer-A (2008) (Egypt). 
215 Executive Regulations of Law No. 95 of 1992, added by the minster of 
Investment order no. 141 for 2006. 
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Material information becomes public information once it is equally accessible 
to the trading public, in light of stock exchange disclosing rules.  
C) Inside information: Any material, nonpublic information about listed 
companies’ activities or one of its related entities.  
 D) Insider: “Any person who has access to information about the company 
or its issued securities, by virtue of which he can benefit from it himself or 
through someone else, whether this access to information has been done 
legally, or illegally, and whether he himself has accessed this information, or 
it has come to his knowledge through someone else in one way or another, 
directly or indirectly.”216 Benefiting from inside information is subject to the 
crimination of Article (64) of the CML.  
H) Insider trading: Where any person who has directly or indirectly benefited 
himself or someone else from trading or using inside information, and the 
beneficiary of the inside information will be considered or deemed to have 
benefited from inside information in accordance with the statutory prohibition 
of Article (64) of the CML.  
According to Article 324, “[i]t shall not be considered insider trader 
whoever trade on securities because of any reason not connected directly or 
indirectly to the inside information.” 217 
3. Examining Insider Trading Statutory Prohibition Under Egyptian 
Law  
The first chapter made it crystal clear that the U.S. system of law 
defines illegal insider trading as a fraud. However, in Egypt, we have criminal 
insider trading. It is market abuse. The Egyptian CML explicitly criminalizes 
insider trading, and the law provides the criminal authority to prosecute insider 
trading.218 
In examining the above series of provisions, we will see that Article 
64 of the CML sets sanctions for stock market violations that might be 
committed by governmental officials or any person (permanently or 
temporarily) hired to provide services for the issuing corporation who, by 
“virtue of his [or her] duties,” knows nonpublic information. The first part of 
Article 64 prohibited disclosing corporate inside information for any reason 
                                                 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 What distinguishes fraud-based illegality from criminal prohibition is 
that in fraud there are elements like a material non-disclosure in the face of an 
affirmative duty to disclose and reliance. In criminal prohibition, the law explicitly 
prohibits and defines the prosecution authority. 
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and not just for trading purposes, as if the disclosure made to benefit the 
issuer’s competitive in a certain market. However, the last sentence of Article 
64 says “or traded on securities in violation of the provisions of Article No. 20 
(Mokrer) of this law.” This part of the prohibition of insider trading might not 
encompass all insider trading violations because the language suggests that it 
is meant to address stock exchange officials, Financial Regulatory Authority, 
rating companies, or any person empowered by stock market law to have 
access to a corporation’s nonpublic information. In other words, Article 64 
proposes to incriminate officials and temporary insiders for insider trading. 
Yet, it does not expressly prohibit insider trading that might be committed by 
any person who is not a government official nor a permanent or temporary 
insider. 
So, the question is, would someone like Chiarella or O’Hagan that is 
not an insider of the company whose securities had been traded on basis of 
nonpublic information, would they fall within article 64? It seems no because 
they were hired to provide services for the issuing corporation. In O’Hagan 
Case Pillsbury was the issuing corporation but O’Hagan law firm worked for 
Grand Metropolitan. In application to the Egyptian law, O’Hagan would not 
be covered under Article 64 of the Egyptian CML executive regulation, but he 
would be liable under Article 20 which seems broader.  
This gap in legislation might be filled by Article No. 20 (Mokrer) of 
the CML in its use of the term “any person.” However, this language does not 
properly address the offense of insider trading because the legislature 
improperly inserted terms to define materiality of information and to show 
causation of prohibition. The article specifically identifies “any person who 
has a material nonpublic information which could impact the status of any 
listed company to trade on its stock before this information became public . . . 
.” Using the phrase “impact the status of any listed company” suggests that the 
cause of prohibition is not to disadvantage the listed corporation. That might 
be interpreted to mean that if the corporation is not itself injured, insider 
trading is not prohibited. However, Article No. 20 (Mokrer) clearly prohibited 
tipping inside information and also made a reference to the Executive 
Regulation of the CML to define materiality of information.  
4. Prohibition of Insider Trading on the Executive Regulation of the 
CML 
Article 319 of the Executive Regulation of the CML adequately 
addressed insider trading; it is a broad parity of information rule.219 The 
language directly defined what might constitute material information by 
                                                 
219 This paper did not address the constitutionality of the legislation 
mechanism of promulgating executive regulation which adds criminalization to the 
CML through a ministerial decree. 
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connecting it to an objective test: when the information has an actual impact 
on the stock’s prices. Article 319 in item (D) had broad disclosure or abstain 
rules and expresses prohibition the same as pre-Chiarella. Item (D) adequately 
defined who is an insider and did not restrict its scope for corporate fiduciaries 
or government officials. Instead, it used the term “any person” to allow insider 
trading prohibitions to apply to any person who came into possession of inside 
information, disregarding the legality of the source of the information, and 
subjected the violator to Article 64 of the sanction.   
Article 319 of the Executive Regulation in item (E) clearly defined 
insider trading and its scope. The language includes those who benefit 
themselves or someone else from trading on the basis of material, nonpublic 
information. Benefits do not have to be pecuniary personal benefits. They 
could be other personal benefits, direct or indirect, whether for oneself or 
someone else. This means Egyptian insider trading regulation does not have 
the Dirks v. SEC and Salman v. United States personal benefit issue. Item (E) 
even established a presumption to satisfy the personal benefit test by saying 
that benefiting someone else without any personal direct or indirect benefits 
would be sufficient to charge someone with insider trading under Article (64) 
of the CML.  
The Executive Regulation of the CML in Article 324 guaranteed the 
disclaimer right for any person charged with insider trading to negate 
culpability if the reason for his or her transaction was for other reasons and not 
on the basis of insider trading. This article ruling exactly resembles the Rule 
10b-5-1 “knowing possession” requirement in American law.220 
5. Insider trading prohibition for portfolio management and brokerage 
companies   
The Executive Regulation of the CML in chapter six determined the 
obligations of portfolio management and brokerage companies towards their 
clients, which include obligations of:  
Article 214 stipulated that the company in execution of its licensed 
activities shall adhere to the principles of honesty, justice, equity, and due 
diligence. 221 
                                                 
220See Donna M. Nagy, The “Possession vs. Use” Debate in the Context of 
Securities Trading by Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never Be Golden, 
ARTICLES BY MAURER FAC. 1129 (1999).  
 
221 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya 
Adad 10 mokrer-h, March 14, 2018 (Egypt),  
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Article 231 prohibited portfolio management or brokerage companies 
from selective disclosure and any direct or indirect discriminatory disclosure 
between their clients. 222  
Article 244 of section five of chapter six of the executive regulation 
expressly prohibited insider trading. It states:  
Neither the owner of the portfolio management or brokerage 
companies nor any of its directors or employees shall transact 
on securities on basis of a secret information that is not 
publicly disclosed for the market or accessible for the trading 
public, even if this information or data was incomplete or was 
about a forthcoming transaction on these securities or any 
material action might affect the securities, its issuer or its 
prices.223 
This article prohibits owners, directors, and employees of a portfolio 
management company or brokerage companies from transacting on any 
securities on the basis of nonpublic information.  
However, Article 244 express prohibition came under chapter six of 
the Executive Regulation of the CML.224 This chapter only regulates 
companies established either to provide portfolio management or brokerage 
services.225 It only prevents owners, directors, and employees (the “insiders”) 
of these two types of companies from trading on securities on the basis of 
nonpublic information received by virtue of their role in these businesses. Yet, 
this prohibition does not completely address insider trading cases, as if one of 
the three insiders mentioned did not trade or transact but tipped inside 
information in related to securities transactions.  
Hence, the insider trading prohibition of Article 244 of Executive 
Regulation of CLM is not a comprehensive criminalization of insider trading 
that might be committed by owners, directors, and employees of companies 
that provide portfolio management and brokerage services. At this point, the 
general provisions of insider trading might be applicable to fill the gap of 
chapter six as in the second example below.     
6. Egyptian court’s insider trading ruling  
The Egyptian Criminal Courts fill gaps where the insider trading laws 
fall short. Cairo Criminal Misdemeanors Court convicted the regional manager 
of American Express Bank in Cairo for insider trading because he traded based 
                                                 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
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on material, nonpublic information for personal benefit.226 The facts say that 
an Egyptian-American Bank planned to sell a large number of its outstanding 
shares, and the American Express regional manager knew about this plan 
because they owned 40% of the outstanding shares of Egyptian American 
Bank (the issuer).227 The regional manager received this information by virtue 
of his job at American Express.228 Therefore, he was an insider according to 
Article (64) of the CML and should not have traded based on this inside 
information.229 
Also, the Cairo criminal court for financial crimes convicted the 
chairman and managing director of a brokerage firm under Articles 64 and 
68230 of the CML because he disclosed nonpublic information about the stock 
trading sessions, which came to his knowledge by virtue of his role at the 
brokerage firm. The Egyptian State Council affirmed this ruling on appeal and 
ruled to discharge the defendant from his chair at the brokerage firm for lack 
of honesty and trust, which is a required character trait to be a key employee 
in a company.231 
III. ENFORCEMENT AND CHARGING FOR INSIDER TRADING 
A. Securities and Exchange Commission in the American Legal System 
1. Securities enforcement law 
In the United States, the enforcement of securities regulations takes at 
least five forms: (1) Private litigation through courts or by arbitration where 
the plaintiff petitions for damages, contract rescission and/or equitable relief; 
(2) SEC enforcement action in administrative proceedings; (3) SEC 
enforcement action in judicial proceedings; (4) Criminal action by the United 
States Department of Justice (DOJ) in federal courts; and (5) Self Regulated 
Organization (SRO)232 action to sanction its members for violations of its 
                                                 
226 Cairo Criminal Misdemeanors Court, financial circuit, case no. 400 for 
2005 ordered January 31, 2005. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Cairo Criminal Misdemeanors Court, financial circuit, case no. 400 for 
2005 ordered January 31, 2005; Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), supra 
note 221. 
230 Id. The actual manager of the company shall be liable to the penalties 
specified in the provisions of this Law for violations committed. Id. The company 
assets shall, in all cases, warrant the payment of the fines. Id. 
231 Cairo Financial Criminal Court, financial misdemeanors circuit, case no. 
976 for 2004.  
232 See Troy Segal, How Does FINRA Differ from the SEC?, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/how-does-finra-differ-sec/ (updated on 
Apr. 23, 2018).  FINRA is the largest SRO in the securities industry in the United 
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rules.233 The DOJ is the only prosecuting authority for securities criminal 
violations through the United States Attorney’s Office.234 The DOJ often 
initiates its securities criminal investigations and prosecutions through SEC 
referrals.235 The SEC derives its investigation powers from sections 20(a) and 
8(e) of the Securities Act, sections 21(a)(1)236 and (2) of the Exchange Act, 
section 209(a) of the Advisers Act, and Investment Company Act section 
42(a).237 These provisions and federal court rulings give the SEC the authority, 
in its discretion, to develop an investigation of particular activities.238 During 
its preliminary investigation, SEC staff may identify certain corporate 
personnel or officers to interview or to present certain information, and 
knowingly and willfully providing false information is a crime.239 The 
Supreme Court held in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Jerry T. 
O'Brien240 that the SEC decisions from informal investigation, formal 
investigation, bringing a case, or making settlements are considered 
“administrative investigations” and its findings are not binding.241  
2. Inside the SEC 
In the wake of the stock market crash in 1929, Congress held hearings 
to investigate related securities regulations to identify the reasons for the 
problem and to address them adequately. Based on these hearings, Congress 
passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934 as federal 
                                                 
States and is a not-for-profit entity. Id. An SRO is a membership-based organization 
that creates and enforces rules for members based on federal laws. See id. 
233 See J. William Hicks, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. SECURITIES 
LAW (2018).    
234 U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 9-27.000 - PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
PROSECUTION, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-27000-principles-federal-
prosecution (last updated Feb. 2018). 
235 Id. 
236 U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) 
(2018). “The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it 
deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is 
about to violate any provision of this chapter . . . The Commission is authorized in its 
discretion, to publish information concerning any such violations, and to investigate 
any facts, conditions, practices, or matters which it may deem necessary or proper to 
aid in the enforcement of such provisions… .” Id. 
237 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h(e), 77t(a) (2018); Security 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (2018); Investment Advisers Act of 
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b–9(a) (2018); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 
80a–41(a) (2018).  
238 Id. 
239 Ralph C. Ferrara & Philip S. Khinda, SEC Enforcement Proceedings: 
Strategic Consideration for when the Agency Comes Calling, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 
1143 (1999).  
240 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 742 
(1984). 
241 Id. 
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legislation to govern the secondary market of securities.242 The Exchange Act 
created the Securities and Exchange Commission to enforce the newly passed 
securities law with the main responsibility of protecting investors, maintaining 
fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitating capital formation.243 
The SEC oversees the key participants in the securities market, 
including securities exchanges, securities brokers and dealers, investment 
advisors, and mutual funds. The SEC uses its enforcement authority to protect 
the stock market from securities violations, especially securities fraud.  
The SEC still faces some challenges to meet its responsibilities 
concerning the stock market. The U.S. securities market is incredibly active,244 
and unlawful trading strategies are becoming more complex and are difficult 
to identify, as identification requires analysis of large datasets. That challenge 
requires even more resources to meet the increasing caseload, and a mass of 
digital information needs advanced technology to penetrate this changing 
landscape.245 Insider trading cases expose not just the advanced technical 
means by which violators obtain secret information, but the lengths and hard 
paths they take to avoid being caught.246 That, in turn, stretches the SEC 
enforcement scope responsibility into newer areas. The SEC enforcement 
actions included actions against IT professionals, hackers who misappropriate 
corporate data, and providers of political intelligence.247 The SEC prosecutes 
civil enforcement suits in federal courts and initial administrative proceedings 
within the SEC against any person or entities who violate the securities law. 
248 
                                                 
242 15 U.S. Code § 77a; 15 U.S. Code § 78a. 
243 See What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last visited on Mar. 25, 2020). The 
responsibility of the Commission is to: 
1. interpret and enforce federal securities laws; 
2. issue new rules and amend existing rules; 
3. oversee the inspection of securities firms, brokers, 
investment advisers, and ratings agencies; 
4. oversee private regulatory organizations in the securities, 
accounting, and auditing fields; and 
5. coordinate U.S. securities regulation with federal, state, 
and foreign authorities. 
244 See US Trading Volume By Quarter, ITG, https://www.itg.com/trading-
volume/quarter/. The number of trading shares of the U.S. stock market is over 130 
Million share per day. Id. 
245 See NAGY ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 685. 
246 See Marc Fagel & Elizabeth Dooley, The Unrelenting Pace of SEC 
Insider Trading Actions, GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS REV. (Nov. 2, 2017), 
https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/article/1149624/the-unrelenting-pace-of-sec-
insider-trading-actions.   
247 Id.  
248 Id.   
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            In 1984 Congress began to sharpen the SEC insider trading remedies. 
Before 1984 the SEC could only seek an injunction, order disgorgement of 
profits or refer the violator to the Justice Department to proceed with a criminal 
prosecution.249 Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act to add another 
penalty that the SEC can execute against insider trading violations.250 The 
amended Securities Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to seek a civil penalty 
of up to three times the amount of profits made or losses avoided by Rule 10b-
5 or 14e-3 violator in addition to any criminal fine ordered.251 
In Fiscal Year 2017, the SEC brought 754 actions and won judgments 
and orders of amount more than $3.7 billion in disgorgement and penalties.252 
Further, the SEC returned $1.07 billion to harmed investors, suspended 
securities of 309 companies, and barred or suspended 625 individuals.253 
2.1. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 and 
The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 
            Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement 
Act of 1988 ("ITSFEA") to combat the increased insider trading misconduct 
in the mid-1980s.254 The ITSFEA language reflects a strong desire to deter and 
to sharpen the SEC enforcement weapons against insider trading.255 The main 
provisions of ITSFEA includes the following:  
1. ITSFEA Section 21A (a) (3) which submitted the person controlling 
an insider trading violation for a civil monetary penalty if the 
controlling person knows or recklessly disregarded the controlled 
person insider trade offense.256  
                                                 
249 JAMES COX, ROBERT HILLMAN & DONALD LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES 
REGULATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 941 (7th ed. 2013).  
250 Congress’s policy of expanding the SEC enforcement tools reached all 
other securities laws violations, the enforcement remedies and Penny Stock Reform 
Act of 1990 expanded the sanctions available to empower the SEC with civil 
penalties and administrative cease-and-desist orders besides its disciplinary authority 
over market professionals. Id. 
251 Id. 
252 Annual Report A Look Back At Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. 
COMM’N DIV. OF ENF’T (last visited Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2017.pdf. 
253 Id. at 3.  
254 Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES 
AND ANALYSIS 381(4th ed. 2015).   
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
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2. The ITSFEA embolden any person knows about insider trading 
violation to tip the SEC in exchange of up to 10% for the penalty 
collected.257  
3. The ITSFEA confirmed the validity of the SEC insider trading tender 
offer Rule 14e-3. Before ITSFEA commentators challenged the 
validity of Rule 14e-3 questioning at what point the tender offer 
actually exist to arise the cause of action for pre-offer activities under 
Rule 14e-3.258 Further, does Rule 14e-3 survive the Supreme Court 
ruling in Chiarella, which requires the pre-existence of a fiduciary 
duty to disclose? Federal Courts rebutted the first challenge and 
determined the scope of insider trading tender offer Rule 14e-3 to 
include activities that follow the moment the target board consider the 
tender offer proposal.259 Regarding the second challenge, ITSFEA 
reflects Congres’s intent in granting the SEC more powerful authority 
to combat and define fraud in Rule 14e-3. The ITSFEA grants the SEC 
the authority to define what constitutes fraudulent conduct and to 
adopt within its owns discretion the reasonable means to stop such 
fraudulent practices.260  
2.2. Injunctions.  
            The enforcement of the securities laws often requires permanent 
injunctions against violators to prevent future violations.261 Many provisions 
like section 21 (A) of the Exchange Act, Section 20(b) of the Securities Act, 
and Section 42 (d) of the Investment Company Act gives the SEC the authority 
to seek a permanent or temporary injunction remedy against any person 
engaged or about to engage in practices that constitute a violation of the 
Exchange Act or other related securities law.262 Even though the issuance of 
injunctions might seem “mild prophylactic,” its effect could be severe because 
the SEC could build the injunction on “likelihood” grounds and past violations, 
not actual new facts.263  The SEC often pray for relief in addition to the 
injunction remedy, the SEC tailored the relief to be inconvenient to the 
violation and violator circumstances. These remedies could take the form of 
                                                 
257 Id. 
258 Howard M. Friedman, The Insider Trading and Sec. Fraud Enf’t Act of 
1988, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 465 (1990), http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol68/iss3/2. 
259 O’Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 529 F. Supp. 1179, 
1192, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also Friedman, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined..  
260 Friedman, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..  
261 Marc I. Steinberg, SEC and Other Permanent Injunctions-Standards for 
Their Imposition Modification and Dissolution, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 27 (1980).  
262 COX ET. AL., supra note 249.   
263 Id. 
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disgorgement of the ill-gotten profits,264 securities sale rescission, appointment 
of a special counsel to carry out an inside investigation about the corporation 
and its management, or to appoint an independent manager to the violated 
company.265 
3.  SEC Divisions 
            The SEC functions through five Divisions and twenty-three Offices.266 
The Commission's staff are located in Washington and in eleven Regional 
Offices throughout the country.267 These Divisions are:268 
1. Division of Corporation Finance: Oversee corporate disclosure of 
continuing and diperiodic information to the investing public.  
2. Division of Trading and Markets: Enforce the SEC responsibility 
for maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets. 
3. Division of Investment Management: Protect and promote investors 
interest on capital formation through oversight and regulation of 
America's $66.8 trillion investment management industry. 
4. Division of Enforcement: Prosecuting division that investigates 
securities violations and recommends commencement of civil actions 
in federal court or as administrative proceedings before an 
administrative law judge. The staff of this division is composed of 
1,452 attorneys, accountants, analysts and other professionals.269 
5. Division of Economic and Risk Analysis: Its main responsibility is 
to integrate robust economic analysis and rigorous data analytics into 
the work of the SEC. Further, to educate and support investors to 
function efficient markets by providing vital support in the form of 
                                                 
264 Disgorgement is not a penalty but is a kind of sanctions meant to prevent 
unjust enrichment, yet when the amount of disgorgement exceeds the ill-gotten gains 
deemed a penalty. See id. 
265 Id. One of the SEC enforcement tools “Obey the Law” injunction orders, 
the SEC utilize this mechanism to issue broad obey the securities law request, so any 
future violation will give rise to an enforcement action. 
266 Offices: Office of the General Counsel, Office of the Chief Accountant, 
Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Office of Credit Ratings, Office 
of International Affairs, Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, Office of 
Municipal Securities, Office of Ethics Counsel, Office of the Investor Advocate, 
Office of Women and Minority Inclusion, Office of the Chief Operating Officer, 
EDGAR Business Office, Office of Acquisitions, Office of Financial Management, 
Office of Support Operations, Office of Human Resources, Office of Information 
Technology, Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, Office of Public 
Affairs, Office of the Secretary, Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, Office of 
the Inspector General, Office of Administrative Law Judges. 
150 SEC, https://www.sec.gov/.  
268 Id. 
269 See Congressional Budget Justification FY 2017, U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION at 16 (2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy17congbudgjust.pdf.  
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economic analyses through its website which includes EDGAR 
database. Further, the division staff provide the economic analysis and 
research, risk assessment, and data analytics.270 
 
4. The SEC Investigatory Process:  
             The SEC insider trading enforcement process is divided into four main 
phases: “detection, preliminary investigation, formal investigation, and 
prosecution.”271 The reason for empowering the SEC by enforcement authority 
is that numerous regulatory provisions of the securities laws create problems 
that might prevent a meaningful pursuit of violations by private plaintiffs.272 
This is because of the nature of the regulations, which focus not on investor 
protection as such, but rather in achieving desired efficiency and general 
confidence in the market.273 
5.1. The SEC Detection, Preliminary Investigation, and Formal 
Investigation 
According to the Division of Enforcement’s Enforcement Manual, 
processing a securities fraud investigation includes certain procedures, 
including the following:274 
            The public can complain or tip the SEC through SEC’s online 
website275 or by contacting any of the SEC’s offices. After assessing the 
reliability of the tip, the complaint or the referral the staff processes it 
according to the SEC manual.276 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act established a Whistleblower Award Program for any 
person who provides information that results in monetary sanctions of over $1 
million on a successful enforcement action, which awards a person 10-30% of 
the total monetary sanctions.277  
                                                 
270 Id.  
271 Andrew P. Van Osselaer, Insider Trading Enforcement & Link 
Prediction, 96 TEX. L. REV. 399, 402 (2017).  
272 James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An 
Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L. J. 737, 74344 (2003).  
273 Id.  
274 SEC, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL (2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf. 
275 SEC CENTER FOR COMPLAINTS AND ENFORCEMENT TIPS, 
http://www.sec.gov/complaint.shtml.  
276 See SEC ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 274, at 12. 
277 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6. 
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The SEC Division of Enforcement, in ranking its investigations 
policies, devotes more resources to investigate cases deemed “National 
Priority Matters.”278 In order to classify an investigation as a National Priority 
Matter, they consider some criteria such as (1) deterrence for a potentially 
widespread misconduct; (2) the position occupied by the violator; (3) whether 
there is a violation of newly-enacted legislation; (4) the riskiness of the 
misconduct for investors or important sector of the market; and (5) whether 
the matter affects a significant number of potential or vulnerable victims.279 
Based on those criteria and the type of violation, the Division of Enforcement 
handles some referrals with great care as if the case is related to Bank Secrecy 
or the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.280 
            After receiving a tip or a referral, a staff member searches–in light of 
the Division procedures and the Assistant Director’s guidance—the 
potentiality of executing a successful enforcement case.281 If the staff reaches 
a positive possibility of successful investigation, she signs into a Hub system 
and recommends opening a Matters Under Inquiry (MUI) and also suggests 
the office that should process the MUI for the sake of achieving the best use 
of the resources of the Division.282 The MUI is then either closed or converted 
to an investigation, and the staff in consultation with the Associate Director or 
the Unit Chief will determine the fate of the MUI.283 If it is turned into an 
investigation, securities law authorizes the SEC and its officers to issue 
subpoenas for a witness to present a document or to take a testimony under 
oath.284 In some urgent cases, the Commission delegates to one of the staff 
members to act on their own discretion on the Commission’s behalf as a Duty 
Officer.285  
The SEC in administrative proceedings can bar a person from 
association with a broker-dealer or investment adviser if there was a civil or 
criminal conviction against him.286 The SEC encourages its staff to close an 
investigation when it becomes apparent that no further steps can be taken.287 
The staff member should consider the seriousness of violations, resources 
available for investigation, the strength of the evidence, who will be harmed if 
he decides to close, and the age of the violation when he decides the proper 
                                                 
278 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT: 
Enforcement Manual 8 (2017). 
279 Id. 
280 Id. at 9. 
281 Id. at 8. 
282 Id. at 12. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. at 25. 
287 Id. at 26. 
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proceeding of the investigation.288 Closing an investigation will be followed 
by termination notices to be sent to every person who was involved in the 
investigation.289 Successful enforcement action cannot be closed unless all 
enforcement is completed either by a final judgment or Commission order and 
after paying the monetary relief in full.290 
The SEC, under certain considerations, may continue its own 
investigations even if there is ongoing SEC litigation. This investigation 
requires an independent good-faith basis as if there is a possibility to add to 
the litigation additional violators.291 The SEC adopts a clear policy in its 
dealing with the press and how to ask for production of documents or 
information. SEC staff must begin with informal channels first to obtain the 
information or the documents in hands of the media member entity.292 If the 
negotiations do not succeed, an assessment will be taken before seeking 
issuance of a subpoena.293 
            When an SEC staff contacts any individual for an investigation, she 
must, and before asking any substantive questions, make certain disclosures 
under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. For example, she must declare that 
even if the laws authorize the SEC to ask for information, a witness is not 
required to cooperate and there is no direct effect upon her for refusing to 
disclose information she might have disclosed. Further, SEC Rule 7 (b) allows 
any person who appears in person at a formal investigation to be accompanied, 
represented and advised by counsel.  
The SEC Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaties (MLATs) (used for Criminal Matters), ad hoc, and voluntary 
cooperation are the channels available to the SEC to contact a foreign witness 
residing in another country. SEC’s Office of International Affairs will review 
and guide the staff members work to request information from a foreign person 
without violating other countries laws.  
5.2  SEC Detection Mechanism 
           The SEC has taken an aggressive stance against insider traders, 
unrelenting against those who abuse nonpublic information and made it a clear 
“No Place to Hide.”294  Insider trading typically comprises approximately 10% 
                                                 
288 Id. 
289 Id. at 27. 
290 Id. 
291 Id. at 32. 
292 Id. 
293 Id. at 40.  
294 Van Osselaer, supra note 271;statement of Former SEC Chair Mary Jo 
White.  
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of the SEC caseload.295 The SEC’s tech-policy utilizes the fact that in a wired 
globe, people are more closely connected than we imagine.296 The SEC’s tech-
enforcement procedures are based on development of in-house, automated, 
market-data-analysis systems. These systems are able to detect suspicious 
trades and therefore reduce the Commission’s reliance on outside tips.297 The 
SEC uses software techniques like link prediction, data synthesis, and 
algorithms to trace the connection between two points on a network using 
breadth-first bilateral analysis.298 
The Commission adopted Rule 613 Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) 
to create a comprehensive consolidated audit trail which allows regulators to 
accurately track all activity throughout the U.S. markets in National Market 
System (NMS) securities.299 The CAT compiles every trade order, execution, 
or cancellation process to be pulled from national stock exchanges and FINRA 
databases, and by using the algorithmic detection systems on all national-
market trading data, the CAT system enables SEC to be everywhere at once.300 
The SEC Market Abuse Unit depends on three market-analysis 
programs: (1) ARTEMIS, which is built to detect suspicious trading patterns 
among traders; (2) ABAP, which is designed to analyze specific transactions 
in order to detect suspicious trading before market-moving causes and shows 
the coordinated transactions; and (3) NEAT, which is designed to allow 
enforcement investigators rapid access to transactions from a massive index.301 
                                                 
295 Marc Fagel & Elizabeth Dooley, The Unrelenting Pace of SEC Insider 
Trading Actions, GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS REVIEW (2017), 
https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/article/1149624/the-unrelenting-pace-of-sec-
insider-trading-actions.  
296 Van Osselaer, supra note 271, at 412 (citing Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, 
Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 354 
(2015)).  This study says among Facebook users, the "average number of 
acquaintances separating any two people in the world was not six [as is often said 
colloquially] but 4.74". Id. 
297 Id. at 399.  
298 Id. at 407. The author refers to an article that discusses the Graph 
traversal technique. See Prateek Garg, Breadth First Search, HACKEREARTH, 
https://www.hackerearth.com/practice/algorithms/graphs/breadth-first-
search/tutorial/.  
299 U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Rule 613 (Consolidated Audit Trail), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/rule613-info.htm (last updated Feb. 24, 
2020). 
300 Osselaer, supra note 271, at 406.  
301 Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Opening Remarks at the 
21st Annual International Institute for Securities Enforcement and Market Oversight 
(Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/remarks-21st-international-
institute-for-securities-enforcement.html.  
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6.  Cross-border insider trading  
          The globalization of securities markets and the rapid increase in the 
number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions has created the environment 
where the largest insider trading violations are committed.302 A securities 
violation committed while trading shares of a foreign company listed in the 
U.S. abuses both the domestic and U.S. market mechanisms.303 
            Under some circumstances, foreign investors prefer to litigate their 
securities disputes in the United States because of some practical advantages 
which include: (1) the possibility of their action being brought in the form of 
class action; (2) the possibility of a well-compensating jury verdict; (3) 
generous discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (4) the 
possibility of obtaining  legal assistance on the basis of a contingent attorney’s 
fee and the absence of a loser-pays rule.304 
            There is no certain SEC policy on when U.S. insider trading rules will 
be extraterritorially applicable, but based on SEC enforcement actions, “it is 
that the trading site—the use of U.S. market mechanisms—that counts 
most.”305 The SEC defines “foreign issuer” broadly to include: foreign issuer 
“foreign government”, supranational entities, foreign private issuers—
essentially U.S. issuers who do not qualify as a foreign private issuer, and 
certain Canadian private issuers.306 A foreign issuer might be subject to the 
U.S. Securities Act of 1934 either because of the size of issued securities or 
because of his free will.307 
            In the 1960s, the increase of international stock markets infused the 
enforcement of the American federal domestic regulations.308 American lower 
courts, in order to decide their jurisdiction over securities fraud cases that 
include a foreign element, adopted some principles based on where the 
fraudulent conduct occurred—"the conduct test"—and the nationality of the 
injured investor or issuer—“the effects test.”309 This custom of adjudicating 
                                                 
302 Donald C. Langevoort, Cross-Border Insider Trading, 19 DICK. J. INT'L 
L. 161 (2000). 
303 Id. at 162.  
304 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). 
305 Langevoort, supra note 302.  
306 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4 (1967). (Providing a definition of “foreign 
government,” “foreign issuer” and “foreign private issuer”). 
307 Id.   
308 Nagy, Painter & Sachs, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 
985.  
309 Staff of the U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Study of the Cross-Border Scope of 
the Private Right of Action Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM'N (2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/929y-study-cross-border-private-rights.pdf. 
See Donald C. Langevoort, Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting the Scope of Antifraud 
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the jurisdiction over these kind of cases lasted until 2010 when the Supreme 
Court decided Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.310       
7.  Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.311 
            In this case, the United States Supreme Court decided “whether § 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of action to foreign 
plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection 
with securities traded on foreign exchanges.”312 
            The Supreme Court ruled that Section 10(b) does not provide a cause 
of action to a foreign plaintiff suing foreign and American defendants for 
misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.313 The 
Court stated,  
[W]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial 
application, it has none. It is a longstanding principle of 
American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary 
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States. If § 10(b) is not 
extraterritorial, neither is Rule 10b–5. On its face, § 10(b) 
contains nothing to suggest that it applies abroad.314  
                                                 
Protection in an Internationalized Securities Marketplace, 55 L. AND CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 241 (1992). At that time Langevoort, argued that “the forces creating an 
internationalized securities marketplace, the prevailing extraterritoriality doctrine has 
become both useless and problematic.” Id. at 242. 
310 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).  
311 Id. 
312 Id. at 250. The respondent in the case was National Australia Bank 
(National), an Australian Bank whose shares were not traded on any stock exchange 
in the United States. National purchased HomeSide Lending, an American mortgage-
servicing company headquartered in Florida. When National wrote down in its books 
the value of HomeSide’s assets, National’s share prices fell. The petitioner is an 
Australian shareholder of National that sued National, HomeSide, and officers of both 
companies for loss the shareholder suffered because of the write-downs of 
HomeSide’s assets. He claimed that the defendants violated §10(b) and 20(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b–5. He claimed that “HomeSide and its 
officers had manipulated financial models to make the company’s mortgage-servicing 
rights appear more valuable than they really were; and that National and its chief 
executive officer were aware of this deception.” Id. at 247252. 
313 Id. 
314 Id. at 247. The court ruled that saying there is a domestic activity in the 
United States where HomeSide executives engaged in the alleged deceptive conduct 
and that shall trigger the U.S. subject matter jurisdiction is rebuttable by the fact that 
“the Exchange Act’s focus is not on the place where the deception originated, but on 
purchases and sales of securities in the United States. Section 10(b) applies only to 
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Further, the Court rejected the notion that the Exchange Act provisions include 
conduct that occurred in the United States and affected exchanges or 
transactions abroad.315 The Court found that if Congress intended such foreign 
application, ‘‘it would have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign 
laws and procedures.’’316 Hence, in Morrison, the Court sought to limit the 
extraterritorial reach of antifraud provisions in U.S. securities laws. Since then, 
the Court has scaled down the exposure of foreign issuers to securities liability 
risk, particularly in class-action litigation.317 
 One month after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison, President 
Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 into law.318 The Dodd-Frank Act 
amended the jurisdictional provision of § 22 of the Securities Act and § 27 of 
the Exchange Act to resuscitate the old jurisdiction conduct and effect tests.319  
The effect test considers “whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial 
effect in the United States or upon United States citizens” while the conduct 
test considers “whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States.”320 
In March 2017, in SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC,321 the District of Utah ruled 
that the plain language of the Dodd-Frank Act’s amendments did not expressly 
overturn the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison.322 Further, the court found 
that Congress clearly intended to authorize the SEC and DOJ to sue on the 
bases of conduct or effects within the United States, regardless of where the 
                                                 
transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges and domestic transactions in 
other securities.” Id. at 249. 
315 Id. at 273. 
316 Id. at 269.  
317 Yuliya Guseva, The SEC and Foreign Private Issuers: A Path to 
Optimal Public Enforcement, 59 B.C.L. REV. 2055 (2018).  
318 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6. 
319 Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which amended § 22 of the 
Securities Act and § 27 of the Exchange Act added the following language: 
The district courts of the United States and the United States court 
of any territory shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding 
brought or instituted by the Commission or by the United States 
alleging a violation of [either Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act or Section 17(a) of the Securities Act] involving: (1) 
conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in 
furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs 
outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; or (2) 
conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable 
substantial effect within the United States. 
Nagy, Painter, & Sachs, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1000.   
320 The Second Circuit, in order to justify its jurisdiction over cases with the 
international element, used to apply these two tests distinct; In a recent case, the 
court combined them to show the strong relevance. See Nagy, Painter, & Sachs, 
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 99599; see also SEC v. Berger, 322 
F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2003). 
321 SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1275 (D. Utah 2017).  
322 Id. 
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securities transactions occurred.323 However, the Dodd-Frank Act’s provisions 
are very important to insider trading enforcement because they allow the SEC 
and DOJ to prosecute cases no matter where the securities was listed or 
purchased.324  
8. The Detection and Surveillance Role of NYSE and NASDAQ 
            The New York Stock Exchange, LLC (“NYSE”) and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation, Inc. (“NASDAQ”) 
are the largest two equities-based and electronic screen-based stock exchanges 
in the world.325 As self-regulatory organizations, the NYSE and NASDAQ 
have their own regulatory systems with incredibly sophisticated algorithms 
and computer programs that flag and alert the SEC to out-of-the-ordinary 
trading.326 In turn, the SEC’s sophisticated computer programs find recent 
news developments and then compile and examine lists of purchasers in order 
to determine if any of them have access to inside information and are involved 
in these securities transactions at all.327 
                                                 
323 Jonathan E. Richman, Proskauer Rose Discusses the SEC’s 
Extraterritorial Reach, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (April 11, 2017), 
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/04/11/proskauer-rose-discusses-the-secs-
extraterritorial-reach/.  
324 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6. 
325 There are currently 13 registered stock exchanges operating in the 
United States. Section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act defines the term “exchange” as:  
any organization, association, or group of persons, whether 
incorporated or unincorporated, which constitutes, maintains, or 
provides a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers 
and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to 
securities the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange 
as that term is generally understood, and includes the market place 
and the market facilities maintained by such exchange.  
See Will Kenton, What Is the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)?, INVESTOPEDIA 
(Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nyse.asp.   
326 NYSE Regulation, https://www.nyse.com/regulation (last visited Mar. 
24, 2020); Market Rules & Regulations Overview, NASDAQ, 
https://www.nasdaq.com/solutions/market-rules-regulations (last visited Apr. 5, 
2020). 
327 More than 85% of Insider Trading violations are correlated to five 
different news categories: “Product announcements, Earnings announcements, 
Regulatory approval or denials, Mergers and acquisitions or Research reports, which 
they collectively refer to as PERM-R events.” A study in 2017 sought to identify 
mathematical patterns that capture the relationship between trading behaviors of 
insiders through collecting insider trade filings by the SEC through the EDGAR 
“with the aim of initiating an automated large-scale and data-driven approach to the 
problem of identifying illegal insider trading.” See Adarsh Kulkarni, Priya Mani & 
Carlotta Domeniconi, Network-based Anomaly Detection for Insider Trading (Feb. 
19, 2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.05809.pdf.   
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9. The NYSE 
 The NYSE’s regulatory system monitors securities activities and 
addresses non-compliance with its rules, as well as federal securities laws, in 
order to “promote just and equitable principles of trade, encourage free and 
open markets, and protect investors and the public interest.”328 The NYSE’s 
insider trading detection techniques apply computer algorithm-based programs 
to prediction and data synthesis, similar to the SEC’s detection mechanism.329 
However, there is a “middleman” on the NYSE trading floor that sits behind 
the traders in every securities transaction.  We will examine the authorities and 
regulations that govern that person’s activities in order to curtail insider 
trading.     
            The NYSE is an auction market, and the middleman who matches the 
best price for the purchaser with the best price for the seller is called the 
“Designated Market Maker” (DMM), formerly known as “the specialist.”330 
The DMM plays a crucial role in the stock trading process on the NYSE. 
Section 240.11(b)(1) of the Exchange Act refers to the DMM as a member 
who may “act as a dealer,” or “act as broker.”331 The DMM’s responsibilities 
are:332 (1) To maintain their assigned securities markets fairly and orderly; (2) 
To act as dealer by matching the highest bid with the lowest offer of certain 
stocks they are assigned;333 (3) To engage in with their own account, using 
their own capital, and with an informed decision to reduce market volatility; 
and (4) To facilitate price discovery trading to treat market imbalances or 
instability in case there is no sufficient buyers or sellers.334 The DMM’s failure 
“to engage in such a course of dealings will result in the suspension or 
cancellation of such specialist's registration in one or more of the securities in 
which such specialist is registered.”335  
9.1 Regulations Govern the DMM’s Role in NYSE 
            The NYSE exercises its surveillance authority over the DMM at the 
end of the trading day and then modifies the DMM’s prohibited Transactions 
                                                 
328 NYSE Regulation, supra note 326. 
329 Id. 
330 See Will Kenton, Designated Market Maker (DMM), INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/designated-market-maker-dmm.asp (last 
updated Feb. 19, 2020). 
331 See Section 3(a)(4)(A) of the Exchange Act for broker-dealer’s 
definitions.  
332 See Section 240.11b-1 of the Exchange Act; see also NYSE Rule 104 
Governing Transactions by DMM.  
333 Most specialists are responsible for trading five to ten stocks. See Fast 
Answers—Specialists, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersspecialisthtm.html 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2020).  
334 See NYSE Rule 104(f)(ii). 
335 See Section 240.11b-1-ii.  
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in three ways.336 First, because the rule already prohibits transactions that will 
create a new high or low price, the NYSE will also modify “Aggressing 
Transactions” that will result in a new consolidated price.337 Second, in 
determining prohibited transactions NYSE will not only consider the DMM’s 
position as defining feature in its decision regarding prohibited transactions. 
Third, shorten the period of announcing the DMM’s prohibited transactions to 
the market.  
            Further, the DMM could be the first tier of measures to prevent 
securities fraud. Hence, NYSE has a set of a very detailed regulations and rules 
governing the conduct and actions of the DMM to ensure that the securities 
are properly and fairly traded.338 Rule 2020 of the NYSE rules reads: “No 
member or member organization shall effect any transaction in, or induce the 
purchase or sale of, any security by means of any manipulative, deceptive or 
other fraudulent device or contrivance.”339 The NYSE Regulation (“NYSER”) 
of detection and surveillance oversees the trading activities on the NYSE 
markets and enforces compliance with securities regulations.340  
            Prior to January 2016, the NYSE outsourced its surveillance and 
enforcement of regulations to the Financial Industry Regulation Authority 
(“FINRA”) through contract.341 After the contract period NYSER is to take the 
responsibility of surveillance, investigation, and enforcement of regulations in 
the NYSE markets while FINRA will continue performing surveillance on the 
cross-market transactions.342 The DMM are obliged to electronically submit 
all of the information regarding its trading activities to the NYSE.343 This 
information will be gathered in the Intermarket Surveillance Information 
                                                 
336 See NYSE Rule 104(g)(i)(A)(III).   
337 The SEC Release No. 34-84515, defined Aggressing Transaction by “the 
DMM transaction that is (1) a purchase (sale) that reaches across the market to trade 
as the contra-side to the Exchange published offer (bid); and (2) priced above 
(below) the last differently-priced trade on the Exchange and above (below) the last 
differently-priced published offer (bid) on the Exchange.”  
338 See Dealings and Settlements (Rules 45—299C), FINRA (2020), 
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/retired-rules-9. 
339 See 2020. Use of Manipulative Fraudulent Devices, FINRA (2020), 
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2020. 
340 NYSE Regulation, supra note 326. 
341 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Release No. 34-
83740; File No. SR-NYSE-2018-33) at 3, Securities and Exchange Commission 
(July 30, 2018) 
342 Memorandum from NYSE Regulation on NYSE Regulation January 1, 
2016 Launch of Certain Surveillance, Investigations, and Enf’t Functions Currently 
Performed By FINRA to All NYSE, NYSE MKT, and NYSE ARCA Members and 
Member Orgs. (Nov. 23, 2015). 
343 Dealings and Settlements (Rules 45—299C) supra note 338. 
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System (ISIS) of the NYSE.344 The ISIS information will be used to observe 
price movements and detect market unusual trading patterns. Computer 
formula techniques will examine insider trading through analyzing ISIS data 
and detect market activities that has the characteristics of a trading activity that 
violates the rules. 
10. The National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation 
(“NASDAQ”)345 
            NASDAQ is a market developed by the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) to be a stock market that 
services electronic securities trading internationally.346 “The Nasdaq Stock 
Market has three distinctive tiers: The Nasdaq Global Select Market, The 
Nasdaq Global Market and The Nasdaq Capital Market. Applicants must 
satisfy certain financial, liquidity and corporate governance requirements to be 
approved for listing on any of these market tiers.”347 
The market structure of NASDAQ is different from that of the NYSE. 
The model of NASDAQ, as an electronic screen-based system, was initially 
created to serve as an option to the specialist-based system.348 NASDAQ is a 
dealer’s market where the sellers and the purchasers will not be participating 
in a direct trade but will be trading through a dealer. In the NYSE, the DMM 
are the market makers, while in NASDAQ the market makers are the dealers 
who will be on at least one side of every trade.349  
10.1 Regulations Govern the Dealer’s Role in NASDAQ 
            The dealers that are the members of NASDAQ are subject, in strict 
compliance, to the rules and regulations of the SEC, FINRA, and NASDAQ 
itself.350 Those rules include the minimum capital, sales methods, trade 
                                                 
344 James L. Cochrane, Brian McNamara, James E. Shapiro, & Michael J. 
Simon, The Structure and Regulation of the New York Stock Exchange, 19 J. CORP. 
L. (1993). 
345 NASDAQ Inc is an American international financial 
services corporation that owns and operates the NASDAQ stock market and eight 
European stock exchanges. See Nasdaq Inc., WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nasdaq, Inc. (last modified Mar. 28, 2020). 
346 Id. 
347 See Nasdaq Listing Center, Initial Listing Guide, (2018).   
348. Will Kenton, NASDAQ Global Select Market Composite, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nasdaq.asp (last updated Mar. 2, 2020). 
349 James L. Cochrane, Brian McNamara, James E. Shapiro, & Michael J. 
Simon, supra note 344.  
350 See NASDAQ, INC., FORM 10-K, EDGARPRO (Feb. 28, 2018), 
http://ir.nasdaq.com/static-files/a6d84f2a-c05a-484d-9d3b-06573888344f.  
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practices, record of information, and protection of funds of the customers.351 
The rules and regulations imposed on NASDAQ’s dealers also serve as a first-
level measure against securities fraud.352  
            For the purpose of detection and surveillance, NASDAQ employed 
supplementary measures in addition to the rules and regulations imposed on 
its dealers. The Securities Exchange Act obliges issuers that trade their 
securities on NASDAQ to file an annual report and to provide NASDAQ with 
any information requested in case of any suspicious market activities.353 The 
filing process is done electronically through Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, Retrieval “EDGAR.”354 As we said in NYSE, NASDAQ also applied 
advanced technology techniques to detect insider trading violations. NASDAQ 
has adopted Artificial Intelligence to surveil insider trading and securities 
fraud.355 The software indicates the transaction that has unusual linkage of 
interests.356 The information of any suspicious trading activity will be passed 
to the SEC for investigation.357 
            Furthermore, NASDAQ recently introduced the SMARTS Trade 
Surveillance and SMARTS Market Surveillance systems for detecting various 
kinds of securities fraud or dark trading activities, including but not limited to 
price control and insider trading.358 The SMARTS Market Surveillance system 
is described as “the industry benchmark for the real-time” and T1 solutions for 
market surveillance, supervision, and compliance.359 The SMARTS Trade 
Surveillance system focuses specifically on the surveillance and monitor of 
trading activities rather than the market as a whole. It alerts the compliance 
teams of the seller in case of an appearance of any suspicious trading activities 
resulting from the detection, investigation, or system analysis.360 
                                                 
351 Id. 
352 Id.  
353 Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, SEC (Apr. 2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-
publications/divisionsmarketregbdguidehtm.html#foot1. 
354 Id.  
355 Supra note 326. 
356 Sara R. Hedberg, IJCAI-03 Conference Highlights, AI MAGAZINE, Dec. 
15, 2003, at 9. 
357 Id. 
358 Roy Girasa, Jessica A. Magaldi, & Joseph DiBenedetto, Shedding Light 
on Dark Pools: Recent Regulatory Attempts Toward Transparency and Oversight of 
Alternative Trading Systems, 37 N.E. J. LEGAL STUD. 75 (2018). 
359 Nasdaq (SMARTS) Trade Surveillance, NASDAQ, 
https://business.nasdaq.com/market-tech/marketplaces/market-surveillance (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2020).  
360 Id.   
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C. Prosecution of Insider Trading in the Egyptian Legal System 
            The Public Prosecutor's Office is the main Egyptian authority 
empowered to initiate all kinds of criminal charges. To reach the end of justice, 
the law, in some circumstances, limits the Public Prosecutor's Office 
prosecuting authority and makes it contingent on another entity’s request. 
Egyptian’s Capital Market Law (CML) makes the Public Prosecutor's Office 
authority to charge for securities violations contingent on a written permission 
from the chairman of the Financial Regularity Authority.  
1. Financial Regularity Authority and the Public Prosecutor's Office 
Prosecutions:  
            In order to unify the supervisory authority over the entire Egyptian 
non-banking financial markets, Article 3 of Law no.10 of 2009 replaced the 
Capital Market Authority by the Financial Regularity Authority (FRA).361 The 
legislator wanted FRA to be the public authority in charge to enforce the 
provisions of CML 95 of 1992 over the entire Egyptian Stock Market. The 
FRA is an independent surveillance authority over the Egyptian stock market. 
Article 93 of the Executive Regulations of CML states that “the Authority 
(FSA) shall oversee the trading market and shall ensure compliance with the 
law and the executive regulations with respect to prohibited activities, such as 
fictitious transactions, price rigging, deceptive devices, cheating, manipulation 
and fraudulent activities in connection with securities transactions.” Hence, 
the FRA is the main governmental authority in charge of achieving the stability 
and integrity of all of the non-banking financial markets. Additionally, the 
FRA in the Egyptian legal system is responsible for spreading investment 
culture and also licenses non-banking financial activities.  
            This means that the FRA not only exercises its surveillance authority 
over listed companies. Its authority extends, according to Egyptian companies’ 
law no. 159 of 1981 to Joint Stock Companies, Limited Partnerships by 
Shares, and Limited Liability Partnerships.  
                                                 
361 We may also refer to FRA by Egyptian Financial Supervision Authority 
(EFSA). See FIN. REG. AUTHORITY, 
http://www.fra.gov.eg/content/efsa_en/efsa_pages_en/efsa_clarification_en.htm (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2020).  
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1.1 FRA Enforcement Resources  
The Egyptian FRA executes its obligations through the following sectors and 
offices:362 
1. Sector of Financial Securities, Financial Statements and 
Corporate Finance;  
2. Sector of Surveillance and Corporate Governance; 
3. Sector of New Business Registration and Licensing; 
4. Sector of Information Services;  
5. Sector of Financial, Administrative Affairs and Personnel; 
6. Central Department for Chairman’s Office Affairs; 
7. Central Department for Legal Affairs; 
8. Central Department for Enforcement; 
9. Central Department for Researches and Policies; 
10. Central Department for Capital Market Development and its 
Securities; 
11. Central Department for Investors Complaints; 
12. Central Department for customer Services; 
13. Central Department for Governmental Insurance Fund. 
 
 
                                                 
362 Senior Management, Fɪɴ. Rᴇɢ. Aᴜᴛʜᴏʀɪᴛʏ, 
http://www.fra.gov.eg/content/efsa_en/efsa_pages_en/dir1_en.htm (last visited Dec. 
7, 2018). 
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The Egyptian FRA issued its own code of ethics for its personnel to prohibit 
any action that might undermine public trust and the integrity of the Authority. 
These rules are:363 
(1) Fundamental ethics: The staff shall observe the integrity and good 
conduct needed to gain public trust, fairness, and non-discrimination in their 
interaction with the public, execute job tasks with due diligence, cooperate 
with other FRA staff, be transparent without violating protected information, 
and observe a high level of decorum with any person interacting with the 
Authority.364  
(2) Exchange of data and private information: Staff shall maintain capital 
market information privacy and not share it outside the Authority; staff shall 
take all necessary precautions to keep all private information secret; it is 
prohibited for the FRA staff, except those who are authorized, to make a press 
release (especially information related to stock prices and corporations listed 
on the stock market as well as any corporate information discovered as a result 
of FRA surveillance procedures); it is prohibited for FRA staff members or 
their relatives to receive any benefits in exploiting nonpublic information that 
is possessed as a result of being in an FRA personnel role.365  
(3) Trade on Stock Market: FRA staff are not allowed to trade personally, or 
through any other person, on listed corporation stocks except in IPOs, public 
mutual funds, governmental pounds, or unlisted securities. If any member of 
the FRA owns or inherited stocks in Egyptian Exchange (EXG) when this 
decree comes into force, that member shall not sell it before putting the FRA 
on notice.366   
(4) Gifts and Courtesy Policy: FRA staff are prohibited from accepting any 
gifts from any entity subject to FRA surveillance authority except when the 
gift is nominal; gifts do not have to be pecuniary but could be a discount for a 
service received or a free vacation for the staff member or the staff member’s 
relatives.367   
1.2 FRA Detection Mechanism   
There are three main systems of detection adopted by the FRA: 
                                                 
363 See the decree of the FRA Chairman no. 75 on June 7, 2010; see also 
EFSA Staff Code of Ethics, Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) (Apr. 
2010), 
http://www.fra.gov.eg/content/efsa_en/pool_extra_efsa_en/methaq1_efsa_en.htm. 
364 Id. at 7. 
365 Id. at 8. 
366 Id. at 9. 
367 Id. at 11. 
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(1) Observation of stock market bids: The FRA Central Department of 
Enforcement has a unit connected with the Egyptian Stock Exchange 
trading screens. The units observe the transactions and take notes for 
bids and deals closed by broker-dealer’s firms and then track its future 
impact on stock prices. If there was any suspicious activity committed, 
the unit will open an investigation to address any possible enforcement 
action.  
(2) Corporation’s file examination: This particular manner of 
surveillance is executed by examining a corporation’s file and its 
periodical financial and administrative reports presented to the FRA.  
(3) Corporation field visit: The CML grants the FRA staff the powers 
and authority of law enforcement officers. FRA staff may or may not 
notify corporations about FRA’s pending field visits where they may 
examine the corporation’s books and ask for the production of any 
specific documents or question any of the corporation’s personnel in 
order to ensure the correct observation of the regulations.  
1.3 FRA Prosecuting Authority 
            The Egyptian FRA resembles the American SEC in its role of oversight 
and ensuring compliance with the law of the stock market. The CML in article 
69 (bis) states: “It shall not be allowed to prosecute for crimes of CML except 
by virtue of a written request from the chairman of the Financial Regularity 
Authority.”368 Thus, the law gives the FRA’s chairman—solely—the authority 
to initiate criminal charges of insider trading or any securities fraud committed 
in violation of the CML and its executive regulations. Criminal charges under 
the CML are brought about by a report signed by the chairman of the FRA that 
includes an explanation of violations and asks the Public Prosecutor's Office 
to initiate such charges. This report is an administrative report, not a judicial 
order, which means it does not initiate the criminal prosecution and is not 
subject to judicial review.369 The report gives the Public Prosecutor's Office 
the authority to initiate criminal charges. The FRA report does not oblige the 
Office to prosecute, as the Office has the discretion to investigate and 
ultimately proceed with the charges. 
 On the other hand, if the Public Prosecutor's Office knows about the 
CML violation from any source and desires to initiate criminal charges against 
the violators, the Public Prosecutor's Office is required to obtain the FRA 
chairman’s permission to proceed with the investigations. The CML also 
provides the chairman of the FRA with the authority to cancel or to dismiss 
                                                 
368 Article 69 (bis) added by law no. 123 for 2008; see also article 6 of law 
no. 10 for 2009, bar Public Prosecutor's Office from initiating a criminal 
investigation without a written consent from FRA.  
369 Nisreen F. Ibrahim, Alreqaba Aledareyaha Wal qdaieyaha Ala A’mal 
Aledaraha fe Magal Souq AlAwraq Al malyiah [The administrative and judicial 
surveillance over the public administrative authority role on stock market] (2016).  
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charges despite the state of progress in investigations or court judgment 
execution.370 
 Article 49 of the CML grants the FRA officers the power and authority 
of law enforcement officers. This authorizes FRA officers to access registers, 
books, documents and any information in the company's offices, in the stock 
exchange, or other offices where these documents may exist. It also obliges 
such entities to cooperate and to produce a copy of any documents that may be 
requested by officers. This article reflects the intent of the Egyptian legislature 
to curtail securities market violations and to reach a reasonable level of 
efficiency. It suggests that the FRA obligations are not merely to issue licenses 
and permit securities offerings, but to take positive steps to reduce market 
violations.  
1.4 FRA Administrative Sanctions:  
 Besides its prosecuting authority, the FRA has the power to apply 
administrative sanctions for corporate violations. According to article 31 of 
the CML, these sanctions could include a notice asking the company to cancel 
or stop the violations within a specific timeframe, limitation of the company’s 
scope of business,371 or appointment of an independent member on the 
company’s board of directors. The appointed member will oversee and 
participate in the board decisions. Also, FRA sanctions could amount to 
dissolution of the board and appointment of an authorized agent until a new 
board of directors is appointed.  Similarly, such sanctions could compel the 
company to increase its security deposit in order to protect investors.  
2. Egyptian Stock Exchange 
 The Egyptian market used to have two stock exchanges: the 
Alexandria Stock Exchange and the Cairo Stock Exchange. Law no. 123 for 
2008 merged them together into one stock exchange called the Egyptian Stock 
Exchange (EXG). Under Rule 902(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, the 
Egyptian Exchange (EGX) is an offshore securities market.372  The EXG is a 
governmental public entity, but the CML allows the establishment of private 
                                                 
370 The policy objectives behind authorizing the FRA chairman to enter into 
settlement or reconciliation agreement with the convicted of securities fraud is to 
trump the economic benefits over the incarceration punishment when the convicted 
accept to pay the double of the statutory fine. We do not agree with this policy 
because deterrence could not be achieved, especially when the defendant is a 
corporation or a wealthy businessman.  
371 See FRA Chairman decree no. 885 for 2018 (freezing trading activities 
of Grand Investment company for a month); see also FRA Cdecree no. 888 for 2018 
(freezing the activities of TIBA for Securities Brokerage for a month).  
372 Letter from Paul M. Dudek, Chief, Office of Int’l Corp. Fin., to Sameh 
El Torgoman, Chairman, Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchs. (Apr. 6, 2003) (on file 
in the SEC online archives).  
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corporations to exercise stock exchange business.373 The EXG executes its 
responsibilities through a board of nine members headed by the EXG 
chairman, and it includes a member from the Egyptian Central Bank. Three 
members represent capital market companies, and two members representing 
listed companies.374 EXG decrees are administrative orders amenable to 
judicial review.375 The EXG board of directors regulates the stock market 
trading rules and oversees its efficiency. The EGX is the primary and 
secondary equity market and exchange for both stocks and bonds.376 The EGX 
consists of the official market, which includes publicly listed companies, and 
the unofficial market, where the transfer of unlisted securities takes place. The 
unofficial market transactions are still subject to revision and approval of the 
EGX.377  
            Article 21 of CML states: The chairman of EXG may suspend trading 
bids aiming at price manipulation, and he may revoke transactions which 
violate securities market regulations. He may also suspend the trading of a 
given security in case it causes harm to the market or may revoke transactions 
that are executed in violation of the CML securities provision. 
3. Private Right of Action Under Egyptian Law 
             Egyptian law allows bringing a case for civil remedies incurred as a 
result of violations of the securities law. The executive regulation of the CML 
in article 218 expressly allows shareholders to bring private actions when they 
suffer financial loss because of insider trading. The law does not require the 
proof of actual reliance on a defendant’s misstatement or the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship; it only requires the showing of causation that one 
actually suffered losses because of the insider transaction or being a victim of 
securities market manipulation.  
4. Insider Trading Jurisdiction  
            Since insider trading under Egyptian law is a crime, the jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the violation of insider trading is a non-administrative court 
(Economic Courts).378 The reason behind establishing Economic Courts as 
                                                 
373 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined.. 
374 See article 6 of the presidential decree no. 191 for 2009.  
375 Ibrahim, supra note 369.  
376 Omar S. Bassiouny & Ahmed Abdelgawad, Equity Capital Markets in 
Egypt: Regulatory Overview (2016).  
377 Id.  
378 For more details about the Egyptian judicial system, see Mohamed 
Abdel Wahab, Update: An Overview of the Egyptian Legal System and Legal 
Research, GLOBALLEX (2008), https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Egypt1.html 
(“[T]he Egyptian Judiciary is comprised of secular and religious courts, 
administrative and non-administrative courts, a Supreme Constitutional Court, penal 
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specialized courts in the Egyptian judiciary system is to fulfill the requirements 
of the corporate sector by expending the dispute resolution period and to 
guarantee that commercial and economic cases are heard by a well-informed 
panel. 
The law of the Egyptian Economic Courts (EEC) no. 120 for 2008 in article 4 
granted the courts of first instance and courts of appeals of the EEC—solely—
the jurisdiction to hear criminal cases of the CML. Further, the EEC in article 
6 granted the courts of first instance of EEC jurisdiction to litigate CML 
monetary disputes on cases over five Egyptian million.379  
CONCLUSION 
Insider Trading in the Egyptian Law Needs a Drafting Reform: 
            As per the insider trading provisions of CML and its executive 
regulation, the Egyptian legislature has a clear intent to prohibit insider 
trading. The Egyptian legislature expressly criminalized insider trading in the 
CML and its executive regulation as well as in article 345 of the Egyptian 
Criminal Code, which regulates securities anti-fraud provisions that are 
applicable to insider trading offenses. However, the law of insider trading is 
sometimes misplaced, or its drafting style fails to properly address the offense 
of insider trading. This can be clarified as follows:  
(1) The language of Article 64 of the CML does not clearly encompass all 
insider trading presumed violations. Insider trading laws need to be drafted 
using generic terms applicable not only to officials of FRA or any market 
player whose actions are governed by securities law, but also to any person 
who trades stocks on the basis of material nonpublic information. Furthermore, 
even though Article No. 20 (bis) of the CML prohibits tipping of inside 
information by using the term “any person,” its drafting style improperly 
inserted the definition of information materiality in addition to including 
causation terms into the text, which might bar charging for insider trading if 
there are no direct and immediate losses incurred as a result of insider trading.  
(2) The executive regulation of the CML in Article 319 not only interprets 
the legislation of the CML, but it also exceeds the scope of interpretation to 
criminalize insider trading. Since the law of insider trading in the CML is not 
self-sufficient as a basis to prosecute for the offense of insider trading, the 
executive regulation of the CML provisions will be required in order to prove 
                                                 
courts, civil and commercial courts, personal status and family courts, national 
security courts, labour courts, military courts, as well as other specialized courts or 
circuits.”). 
379 However, if the defendant in a CML basis dispute is a public 
administrative authority or the plaintiff pray to revoke or amend a public authority 
decree the jurisdiction will be concluded to the State Council Administrative Courts.  
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a well-grounded insider trading case. However, this is not constitutional 
because the executive regulation is issued as per a ministerial decree.  
(3) The executive regulation of the CML regulated an uncomprehensive 
separate prohibition of insider trading that is only applicable to portfolio 
management and brokerage companies. Article 244 of section five of chapter 
six of the executive regulation prohibits owners, directors, and employees of a 
portfolio management company or brokerage company from transacting on 
any securities on the basis of nonpublic information. The phrasing of Article 
244 is redundant because, if the CML law of insider trading is a general and 
abstract law, there is no need to reregulate insider trading for portfolio 
management and brokerage companies. Yet, Article 244 insider trading law 
does not encompass all conceivable insider trading violations of owners, 
directors, and employees of a portfolio management company or brokerage 
companies.  
The Need for an Effective Enforcement Mechanism and Adequate 
Resources  
            Langevoort once said, “One of the most obviously, and troubling, 
phenomena in international securities regulation is that even as the ‘law on the 
books’ in most developed countries . . . the commitment of surveillance and 
enforcement resources varies considerably.”380 Egyptian law ostensibly aims 
at prohibiting securities fraud. The Egyptian judiciary system does not tolerate 
securities fraud and firmly applies securities law. However, there is no 
effective enforcement mechanism in place. On the other hand, although the 
United States insider trading law in some circumstances does not achieve 
clarity and completeness, the SEC applies a very effective enforcement 
mechanism.  
The Need for More Resources  
 In order for the Egyptian FRA and the Egyptian Stock Exchange to 
undertake their surveillance role over the securities market, they need to adopt 
the same theory of detection and enforcement mechanisms employed in highly 
active stock markets. As we explained in Chapter II, the fraud detection 
mechanism adopted by the SEC relies on smart technology and computer 
programs.  
                                                 
380 Donald C. Langevoort, Cross-Border Insider Trading, 19 Dɪᴄᴋ. J. Iɴᴛ'ʟ 
L. 161, 163 (2000). 
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 The FRA responsibilities over the entire non-banking sector are 
crucial. In order to undertake these responsibilities, it requires adequate 
resources to better guide the Egyptian economic reform.381   
 
  
                                                 
381 In addition to the insider trading law reform and while the Egyptian 
authorities relentlessly strive to boost the Egyptian economy, the stock market’s 
refinement should be their top priority. As such, the main role expected from the 
Egyptian FRA and EGX at the moment is to ease the capital formation to push the 
wheels of such heavy industry. The Egyptian legislature has been pleading with 
corporations working in Egypt to list their securities in the EGX and has attempted to 
incentivize corporations to do so through a considerable tax deduction scheme. Yet, 
there is a meager number of listed corporations in the EGX. Time is running out; it is 
naïve to wait for family-based corporations to build the Egyptian economy. For 
Egyptian national policy to influence real investment, the legislature should 
concentrate on assisting the private sector and startup businesses in particular. 
Capital formation in Egypt’s economic system is still very costly because of the 
exorbitant interest rate in the entire economic system, and this could undermine the 
practicability of capital formation. The Egyptian economic system is in a dire need 
of the investment of middle-class citizenry in corporations’ stocks. Consequently, 
they had to introduce and renew public trust in the stock market. This could be the 
only solution to both overcome the challenge of high interest rates and ease the 
capital formation of new businesses. Tax deduction incentives should be given 
primarily to corporations that devote a percentage of their revenues to research 
funding. The Egyptian legislature should enact a law that considers such research 
funding to be a social responsibility of corporations operating in Egypt. We believe 
that only one important Egyptian patent can push the economic growth forward to 
make great strides.  
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